Indiana Law Journal
Volume 73

Issue 1

Article 2

Winter 1997

How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives
Jonathan T. Molot
Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Molot, Jonathan T. (1997) "How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 73 :
Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol73/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law
Incentivest
JONATHAN T. MOLOT*

INTRODUCTION ...................................................
I. TORT THEORY ..................................................
A. A Fault-BasedSystem .........................................
B. A Regime of Liability Without Regard to Fault ....................
C. Common Elements of Negligence and Strict Liability Regimes .......
II. How COSTS MAY OVERWHELM MERITS: AMERICA'S APPROACHES
TO DISCOVERY AND FEE SHIFTING .................................
A. The Importance of Legal Fees in Litigation and Settlement .........
B. Control over Legal Fees .......................................
C. Fee Shifting .................................................
III. THE AVAILABILITY OF CONTINGENT-FEE ARRANGEMENTS ...........
A. ContingentFees and the Decision to File a MeritoriousLawsuit .....
B. ContingentFees and Settlement Dynamics .......................
1. Improving Plaintiffs' Bargaining Positions ....................
2. Increasing Settlement Amounts by Decreasing Plaintiffs'
Relative Litigation Expenses ................................
3. Conflicts of Interest Between Attorney and Client ..............
4. Sum m ary .................................................
C. Defendants' PresettlementLitigation Expenses ...................
D. Contingent-FeeArrangements and MeritlessLawsuits .............
1. Information Asymmetries ...................................
2. Timing and Extent of Litigation Effort ........................
3. The Client's W ishes ........................................
IV. SKEWED DETERRENCE AND COMPENSATION ........................
A. Predictabilityand Deterrence ..................................
B. Settlement Without Regard to Causation ........................
C. Settlement Without Regardto Negligence .......................
D. Tertiary Costs Become Primaryand Secondary Costs .............
V. PROCEDURAL REFORM .........................................
CONCLUSION ....................................................

60
63
64
65
68
68
69
72
78
81
82
85
86
86
88
92
93
95
95
97
98
99
99
100
102
105
108
116

t © 1997 by Jonathan T. Molot.
* B.A., 1988, Yale College; J.D., 1992, Harvard Law School. Associate, Kellogg, Huber,
Hansen, Todd & Evans, Washington D.C. My thanks to David Ellen, Ward Famsworth, Susan
Freiwald, Julie Hilden, Christine Jolls, Howard Shelanski, Aaron Rappaport, and Hattie
Ruttenberg.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 73:59

INTRODUCTION

Corporations, politicians, and the media generally share the sense that litigation
in the United States is inordinately expensive and that our system of litigation
thus deters productive conduct.' While this belief is widely held, it is nevertheless
quite controversial.' Any thorough analysis of this problem must pick up where
popular opinion leaves off. In order to test popular sentiment, it is necessary to
examine, first, how certain procedural rules affect deterrence, and second,
whether our particular procedural framework does, in fact, lead to overdeterrence
when compared to other procedural systems.
It is self-evident that parties make litigation and settlement decisions based
upon the procedural setting, and not just the merits, of a given case. In particular,
lawyers and clients alike understand that the cost of litigation may affect
outcomes. It is less obvious, however, which procedural rules contribute to the
costliness of litigation and whether these rules together lead more often to
plaintiffs foregoing meritorious suits, to defendants paying for meritless ones, or
to parties settling meritorious suits early and thereby avoiding the costs of
litigation entirely. Without further inquiry, it is impossible to determine whether
expensive litigation leads defendants to expect to pay more, less, or the same
amounts for suits as they would under substantive law alone. Such expectations
are at the core of any analysis of how procedural rules affect deterrence.
To date, legal scholarship has not focused on the interplay between substantive
law deterrence and civil procedure In the area of tort law, for example, legal
scholars have examined the ability of negligence and strict liability regimes to
achieve efficient and fair deterrence and compensation, without taking into

1.See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation,

46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (1994) ("[E]conomic concerns rather than the merits of a case
too often govern the decision to file a civil suit."); Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik,
PreliminaryObservationson Implementation of the PilotProgram of the Civil Justice Reform

Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (1994) ("[A]ccording to the oft-heard indictment
of the civil justice system,... American businesses face difficulty competing with foreign
adversaries."); Marc Galanter, Reading the LandscapeofDisputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About ourAllegedly Contentious andLitigious Society, 31 UCLA

L. REV. 4, 6-11 (1983) (describing public perceptions of litigiousness); Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the

Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395-96 (1994) (blaming
media for public perceptions that we are exceedingly litigious, that plaintiffs file frivolous
lawsuits, and that greedy lawyers typically engage in discovery abuse); Dan Quayle, Civil
Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 1, at 11 (questioning the productivity of our present
adversary system); Mullenix, supra note 1, at 1395-96 (describing myth of widespread
discovery abuse).
3. One exception worth noting is J. Robert S. Pritchard, A Systemic Approach to
Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of
Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451 (1988) (arguing that different litigation rules may alter

the evolution of substantive rules across legal systems).
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account the effect of civil procedure.4 Conversely, civil procedure scholarship has
explored how isolated rules influence settlement dynamics without regard to the
aggregate effect of these rules on ex ante behavior (sometimes termed "primary
conduct")., Accordingly, neither area of scholarship has examined how a
particular procedural regime may lead defendants to expect to pay for
nonnegligent conduct despite a governing negligence standard, to pay for
accidents they do not cause, or conversely, to escape liability for meritorious
claims.
This Article explores that gap between tort law scholarship and civil procedure.
Part I provides a brief summary of the relevant scholarship on tort law deterrence.
As noted above, that scholarship explores how tort law could achieve its goalsefficient and fair deterrence and compensation-based on substantive law alone.
Part II then explores why potential defendants cannot assume that substantive
law will determine their tort payments. Drawing upon civil procedure scholarship
and settlement theory, Part II describes how America's liberal discovery rules,
together with its refusal to shift attorneys' fees, often lead nonmerits factors to
overshadow the merits when plaintiffs decide to file, and parties decide to settle,

4. Some scholars have questioned whether tort law actually achieves the deterrence that
tort theory envisions. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966-67 (1984) (explaining how
uncertainty over a legal rule's likely application may result in undercompliance or
overcompliance); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort

Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87 (1994) (summarizing claims that tort law
is either superfluous or futile). Others have addressed procedural issues tangentially, for
example, by comparing the administrative costs of a strict liability regime with those of a faultbased one. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. But none has looked to procedural
rules to explain tort law's actual deterrent effect.
5. Scholars have considered the combined effect of several procedural rules on the
quantity and expense of cases filed, without distinguishing meritorious cases from meritless
ones or examining their effect on deterrence. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The AdversarySystem:
Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1984); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law
Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation,
1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 851-55. Law and economics scholars have made great progress in

understanding the dynamics of litigation and settlement. They have explored settlement theory
in depth, and have addressed the ways in which different procedural rules may alter settlement
dynamics. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes

and TheirResolution, 27 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067 (1989) (reviewing the literature). But, this
improved understanding of litigation generally has taken the form of isolated studies of isolated
procedural issues. The effect of a particular rule on settlement dynamics is sufficiently
complicated that scholars are understandably hesitant to consider the combined effect of several
procedural rules at once, let alone the effect of an entire procedural system, on the substantive
law. See id. at 1085. This Article's analysis of litigation rules accordingly does not rely
exclusively upon law and economics theory-which often rests upon restrictive assumptions
that hinder extrapolation-but rather refers, in addition, to empirical studies and other
traditional legal scholarship. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 1; Mullenix, supra note 1; David
M. Trubek et al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983). This Article
further attempts to avoid the pitfalls of such a broad inquiry by narrowing the goal: it seeks to
determine only the effect of litigation rules on a defendant's pocketbook (which is crucial to
deterrence) and avoids further conclusions about the effects on court congestion or attorneys'
profits.
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lawsuits. Liberal discovery and non-fee-shifting-two core features that
distinguish the American system from the English model-result in unreasonably
high litigation costs that are beyond a party's control, and that parties must bear
regardless of the merits.
Assuming that the underlying substantive law is structured appropriately, these
characteristics of litigation in the United States could result in underdeterrence,
efficient deterrence, or overdeterrence depending upon whether they (1) lead
plaintiffs to forego meritorious lawsuits or to settle such suits for less than the
merits warrant, (2) lead both parties to settle early based on the merits and avoid
entirely the costs of litigation, or (3) lead defendants to pay too much for
meritorious lawsuits and significant amounts for even meritless ones. Because the
literature to date has considered discovery and non-fee-shifting rules in isolation,
it has not determined the ultimate effect on deterrence.
Part III resolves this uncertainty by considering the effects of discovery and
non-fee-shifting rules together with another American departure from the English
model: the availability of contingent-fee arrangements. When the three sets of
rules are considered together, it becomes clear that defendants' total tort
payments exceed what they would pay under substantive law alone.
Part III.A explains how contingent-fee arrangements increase the rate at which
plaintiffs file meritorious suits-even small ones-principally by shifting some
litigation risk to attorneys who can spread it over the many suits in their
caseloads. Thus, contingent-fee arrangements largely eliminate the possibility that
high litigation costs will enable defendants to avoid liability completely.
Part III.B demonstrates that contingent-fee arrangements also preclude
defendants from expecting to settle cases for less than the merits warrant. By
shifting risk to attorneys, contingent-fee arrangements improve plaintiffs'
bargaining power. In addition, contingent-fee arrangements provide lawyers with
an incentive to hold down litigation expenses, and thereby enable plaintiffattorney teams (the predominant users of contingent-fee arrangements) to manage
escalated litigation costs better than defendant-attorney teams. This, in turn,
enables plaintiffs to threaten continued litigation, thereby bolstering their
leverage in settlement negotiations. These positive effects on settlement amounts
may be mitigated somewhat by conflicts of interest between plaintiffs and their
attorneys, who have greater incentives to settle than their clients. On balance,
however, contingent-fee arrangements ensure that settlements are sufficiently
large that defendants cannot expect their tort settlements routinely to fall short of
what they would pay under substantive law alone.
Part III.C demonstrates that in addition to payments for injuries in meritorious
cases, defendants must pay significant presettlement litigation costs. Defendants
cannot hope to settle all cases early for exactly what the merits warrant, thereby
escaping the high costs of litigation. If defendants adopt a strategy of settling,
they may reduce their legal fees, but they will also increase their payments to
plaintiffs, and invite more filings as they develop a reputation for settling.
Finally, Part III.D demonstrates that defendants' total tort payments include not
only legal fees for meritorious cases, but also legal fees and settlements in
meritless cases. Part III.D explains why plaintiffs and their contingent-fee
attorneys may hope to profit from meritless cases, and why defendants must bear
some expense to defend and settle these cases. The discussion thus concludes that
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when the availability of contingent-fee arrangements is considered together with
America's approach to discovery and fee shifting, defendants not only must pay
for meritorious claims-as substantive law alone would require-but also must
pay significant presettlement litigation expenses and substantial amounts to
dispose of meritless cases.
Part IV then returns to tort theory, exploring how the realities of litigation and
settlement described in Parts II and III alter the deterrence and compensation
postulated by tort theory in Part I. A procedural rule's deterrent effect may
depend upon its foreseeability to potential defendants, and Part IV explains that
our litigation system's structure affects settlement amounts in a sufficiently
predictable manner as to have a major impact on tort law deterrence. Ultimately,
the U.S. procedural system alters deterrence incentives in two ways not taken into
account by tort theory. First, defendants must structure their conduct in
anticipation of meritless, as well as meritorious, cases. The discussion
demonstrates that a defendant's fear of liability without regard to causation is
more serious than his fear of being held liable without regard to a governing
negligence rule, but that both give rise to needless social costs. Second, the
prospect of defending even meritorious lawsuits results in overdeterrence because
potential defendants must anticipate paying for litigation as well as for tort
injuries. Part IV argues that some portion of a defendant's litigation expenses
should not be internalized along with the costs of accidents because defendants
are not the "cheapest cost avoiders"6 with respect to these costs. When a
defendant's total litigation costs are considered, the tort system overdeters
efficient conduct.
Finally, Part V suggests that although the problem of overdeterrence is quite
serious, it can be remedied without abandoning America's approach to discovery,
fee shifting, and contingent-fee arrangements that are central to preserving access
to justice. Rather, the system's ills may be cured through adjustments at the
margins. Part V notes possible reforms-building principally upon Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 11 and 68-that could lead defendants to expect to pay
amounts more closely tied to the merits.
I. TORT THEORY

Our system of tort law is a harm-based, rather than a risk-based, regime.
Although the government may regulate risky behavior directly (e.g., by punishing
reckless driving), tort law comes into force only when that risky behavior has
resulted in some tangible harm (e.g., when the driver hits a pedestrian). 7 Thus,
two people may engage in the same risky conduct and yet only the person whose
conduct actually results in an accident can be held liable under our tort law. One
could imagine an alternative risk-based regime, under which people would be

6. GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF AccIDENTs 254 (1970).
7. See W. PAGE KEETONET AL., PROSSERAND KEEroNON TE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165
& n.5 (5th ed. 1984). This Article does not specifically address intangible offenses, such as
slander, where no proof of damage is required. See id. § 112, at 788 (explaining that proof of
the defamation itself is considered to establish the existence of some damages, and that the jury
is permitted to estimate their amount without other evidence).
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taxed for the risks they create, and the proceeds of this tax used to pay victims
whenever those risks came to fruition.8 Either way, tort law would promote the
same dual goals: deterrence of certain risky conduct and compensation of
accident victims.
A. A Fault-BasedSystem
As every first-year law student quickly learns, even within our harm-based
system there are different ways to pursue these twin goals. 9 A fault-based regime
seeks to deter only unreasonably risky behavior by creating liability only for
negligent acts. Every day, each of us risks both our own well-being and that of
others. Without taking such risks, or imposing them upon others, we could not
perform basic tasks, such as driving to the grocery store, that are essential to a
productive life. From an economic perspective, it would be inefficient for tort law
to deter reasonable risks. ° Hence, the Hand Formula ensures that only inefficient
risks-that is, those that could be avoided without undue cost-will be
punished."
In addition to defending this negligence standard as efficient, legal scholars
have sought to defend it as fair."2 Because a rational individual would accept only
reasonable risks for himself, a rational individual may only ethically impose
reasonable risks upon other persons. To expose another person to risks that we
would not rationally accept for ourselves-that is, to expose another to risks that
outweigh potential rewards-is to use that other person to our own end. It
therefore seems just that the creator of an unreasonable risk should compensate
his or her victim, but that the costs of reasonable risks can be left where they fall
(i.e., on the accident victim). 3

8. Cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW 875-82 (1983) (describing
broad New Zealand no-fault scheme in which funding for accidents comes from an employment
fund, a motor vehicle fund, and a supplementary catch-all fund) (citing TERENCE G. ISON,
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME (1980)).

9. As this Article's goal is simply to demonstrate how procedural rules can vary the
deterrent and compensatory effects of a substantive law regime, and not to debate which
substantive law regime is best, a full-blown discussion of the various theoretical debates in tort
scholarship would be extraneous.
10. See KEETON Er AL., supranote 7, § 31, at 170 ("Nearly all human acts, of course, carry
some recognizable but remote possibility of harm to another. No person so much as rides a
horse without some chance of a runaway, or drives a car without the risk of a broken steering
gear or a heart attack. But these are not unreasonable risks.").
IL1See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (weighing
the probability ("P") that an accident will occur and the likely loss ("L") if an accident does
occur against the burden ("B") of taking "adequate preparations" to prevent the accident).
12. Of course, a utilitarian might defend the negligence standard's morality precisely
because it promotes efficiency.
13. See Richard A. Posner, The Concept of CorrectiveJustice in Recent Theories of Tort
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 200 (1981) ("[C]orrective justice requires annulling a departure
from the preexisting distribution of money or honors in accordance with merit, but only when
the departure is the result of an act of injustice, causing injury.") (emphasis in original);
Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137, 151 (1951).
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B. A Regime of Liability Without Regardto Fault
A regime that imposes liability without regard to fault has the same deterrence
goal as the fault-based system described above: to discourage only unreasonable
risks.' 4 Yet, proponents of strict liability recognize that often the defendant may
be better able than a court to evaluate the risks imposed and the means by which
those risks may be reduced.' If an actor knows that he will be liable for the
accidents he causes, without regard to negligence, then he will weigh the risk of
accidents against the cost of preventive measures and pursue efficient preventive
measures.' Given that the person who controls an activity (e.g., the manufacturer
of a product) is in the best position to minimize accident costs (i.e., is the
"cheapest cost avoider"), it makes sense to impose the costs of accidents upon
him. 7
Moreover, by internalizing the accident costs of an activity, strict liability not
only encourages an actor to adopt efficient safety precautions while engaging in
an activity, but also promotes the efficient allocation of resources acrossdifferent
activities.'8 For example, strict liability not only encourages a common carrier
(e.g., a railroad, airline, or bus company) to take appropriate safety precautions,
but also, by internalizing the accident costs of an unsafe mode of transportation
and thus making it more expensive, strict liability encourages passengers to
choose a safer mode of transport. 9
In addition to reducing the "primary" costs of accidents (and accident
avoidance measures), strict liability reduces the "secondary" costs of
accidents-that is, the costs to society of the accidents that do occur.20 Strict
liability does this, the scholarship contends, by placing accident costs upon
someone who is better able than the victim to spread the costs of an accident over
the broader group of people who benefit from the activity that has caused the

14. The economic and moral arguments for strict (or faultless) liability are perhaps even
more fully developed than those for fault-based liability. Guido Calabresi is generally credited
with the economic analysis of strict liability. See CALABRESI, supra note 6; Guido Calabresi &
Jon T. Hirschoff, TowardaTest for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). Jules
Coleman, Richard Epstein, George Fletcher, and Ernest Weinrib are among those who have
discussed strict liability's ethical underpinnings. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS
(1992); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 168-69 (1973);
George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Ernest
J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent RationalityofLaw, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
15. See CALABRESI, supranote 6, at 69 ("[N]o one knows what is best for individuals better
than they themselves do."); Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 14, at 1060.
16. See CALABRESI, supra note 6, at 73.
17. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supranote 14, at 1060.
18. See CALABRESI, supranote 6, at 73.
19. A negligence standard does not encourage such cross-industry comparisons, but rather
asks whether a particular defendant in the particular circumstances made a reasonable choice
(often measured by reference to industry standards). Cf id. at 68-69 (describing "general"
versus "specific" deterrence).
20. See id. at 27-28; KEETON ETAL., supra note 7, § 98, at 692-93.
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accident.2 As mentioned above, our tort system is a harm-based system, under
which those involved in risky behavior, whether they create or bear a risk, will
not suffer any of its consequences unless the risk actually results in an injury.
However, by internalizing the costs of accidents, and making risky activities more
expensive, strict liability effectively spreads the costs of those injuries over all
involved.
For example, millions of passengers may travel by airplane without mishap. By
requiring airlines to compensate those few passengers who suffer harm from
infrequent crashes, strict liability generally increases the cost of air travel, a cost
which airlines presumably will pass on to all of their passengers through more
expensive tickets. Strict liability thereby spreads the costs of a few passengers'
suffering over the multitude of passengers who bear the same risk but escape
harm. Strict liability, then, provides a mandatory insurance scheme for air travel,
or any other activity to which it applies. Because the relevant activity's many
beneficiaries are better suited to bear large accident costs than its few victims,
this insurance scheme spreads the costs of accidents more efficiently than would
a system that leaves those accident costs that are not the result of negligence upon
the few, unlucky victims. 2
Finally, strict liability reduces "tertiary" costs, that is, the transaction costs
associated with endeavors to reduce primary and secondary costs.' By removing
the issue of fault from litigation, strict liability may reduce such transaction costs
as having a jury determine whether the defendant acted negligently. 4
While strict liability has been defended on several ethical grounds, 25 the most
straightforward moral justification of strict liability is that it is fair, as well as
efficient, for the beneficiaries of an activity to bear its costs. While negligence
liability leaves the costs of reasonable risks where they fall (upon accident
victims), there is a strong moral argument against such a practice. This argument
is most obvious in the case of nonreciprocal risks.26 Even if a construction
company uses dynamite efficiently, taking safety precautions and ensuring that

21. See CALABRESI, supra note 6, at 51.
22. Calabresi summarizes:
The advantages of interpersonal loss spreading would probably be stated as a pair
of propositions: (1) taking a large sum of money from one person is more likely
to result in economic dislocation, and therefore in secondary or avoidable losses,
than taking a series of small sums from many people; (2) even if the total
economic dislocation were the same, many small losses would be preferable to
one large one simply because people feel less pain if 10,000 of them lose one
dollar apiece than if one person loses $10,000.
Id at 39 (footnote omitted). For a more in-depth discussion of how loss spreading may reduce
secondary accident costs, see id. at 39-67.
23. See id. at 28.
24. See id. at 251 ("The most expensive aspect of the fault system is its case-by-case jury
determination of who should bear losses."); KEETONETAL., supranote 7, § 98, at 693 (arguing
that proof of the existence of fault or negligence should no longer be required).
25. See generally COLEMAN, supranote 14; Epstein, supra note 14; Fletcher, supra note
14; Weinrib, supra note 14.
26. See generallyFletcher, supranote 14 (introducing "reciprocity" paradigm as substitute
for traditional "reasonableness" paradigm in tort law).
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blasting's rewards outweigh its risks, the company may nevertheless expose
others to greater risk than people generally impose upon one another through
regular interaction. It would be unfair to fail to compensate the injured passerby,
who would never impose such a risk upon the construction company, simply
because the construction company's risks are cost justified. If the construction
company, or the owner of the building under construction or perhaps society more
broadly, benefits from the extremely dangerous activity,27 it is only fair that these
beneficiaries should be required to compensate their victims. Recognizing this,
tort law has long imposed strict liability upon ultrahazardous activities.2"
This moral rationale for liability for nonreciprocal risks can be extended to
reciprocal risks as well.29 For example, in Lubin v. Iowa City,30 Mrs. Lubin was
entitled to compensation when a water main burst, flooding her basement. Prior
to the accident, Mrs. Lubin and other residents had benefitted equally from lower
water prices attributable to the city's reasonable policy of refusing to dig up
streets to test water mains. Mrs. Lubin and other residents likewise bore equal
risks, for nobody knew exactly where the city's water pipes would give way or
whose basement would be flooded. Nevertheless, the water company and,
indirectly, its customers, were required to reimburse Mrs. Lubin. It would have
been unjust to allow each resident to enjoy the benefits of water service but hope
the burdens would be borne by another. Rather, it is fair that all those who benefit
should share in the costs.3

27. Cf MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 97101 (1977) (describing rise of negligence standard as a subsidy to "those who undertook
schemes of economic development").
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 7,
§ 78, at 545-59.
29. For a moral defense of liability based upon causation alone, see Epstein, supra note 14,
at 168-69 & n.49.
30. 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964).
31. The Supreme Court of Iowa in Lubin summarized risk cost allocation as follows:
The risks from such a method of operation should be borne by the water supplier
who is in a position to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the
true beneficiaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and
maintenance costs. When the expected and inevitable occurs, they should bear the
loss and not the unfortunate individual whose property is damaged without fault
of his own.
Id. at 770; see also Recent Development, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1728-30 (1991) (suggesting
"benefit-burden fairness" as ajustification for tobacco company liability); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 28 (1971) ("Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right
by a greater good shared by others."). But cf Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and
Wrongful Gain, II J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 423-25 (1982), reprintedin JULES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 184, 185-87 (1988) (noting disparity between losses to
victim and gains to tortfeasor as problematic for moral defenses of strict liability); Nancy A.
Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 977-86 (1994)
(summarizing Coleman's work).
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C. Common Elements of Negligence and Strict Liability
Regimes
Despite differences, negligence and strict liability regimes share important
features. First, both respond only to those risks that actually result in accidents;
as noted above, they are harm-based, not risk-based, regimes.3 2 By ensuring a
sufficient connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury,
tort law provides an economically, and morally, coherent deterrent message: a
person can anticipate being held liable for a risky activity only if that activity
actually results in a concrete harm to someone else. Conversely, a person who
structures his or her activity so that it cannot harm someone else can be sure of
avoiding liability.
Second, strict and fault-based liability regimes both endeavor to deter only
unreasonablerisks. A fault-based regime leads defendants to expect to pay only
for injuries caused by unreasonable risks. A strict liability regime encourages
people to act reasonably by threatening them with liability for all injuries they
cause, inducing them to figure out for themselves which risks are reasonable.
II. How COSTS MAY OVERWHELM MERITS: AMERICA'S
APPROACHES TO DISCOVERY AND FEE SHIFTING

The moral and economic theories outlined above rely upon substantive rules of
law to lead people to act efficiently and fairly. These theories implicitly assume
a world in which the only incentives provided by the legal system are those found
in substantive law.

33

32. This requirement of a proven connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury-that is, causation-is found in other tort doctrines as well. In the context of
an intentional tort, such as battery, a plaintiff should have little difficulty proving that the
defendant's act "cause[d] an unpermitted contact." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 9, at 4 1.
Under the negligence-related evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant had exclusive control over the instrumentality of the accident, and that this
kind of accident does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. See id. § 39, at 244.
Just as under negligence and strict liability, then, under the tort doctrines of battery and res ipsa
loquitur there must always be a proven connection between the defendant's activity and the
actual harm suffered by the plaintiff. Under res ipsa loquitur doctrine, this connection may be
established by proving that the defendant controlled the instrumentality of the accident, rather
than that he caused the accident; in either case, the effect is similar.
33. This is not to say that scholarship has completely ignored the effect of factors other than
substantive law on deterrence. For example, scholars have long recognized the most obvious
way in which procedural reality may affect real-world deterrence: a tortfeasor may hope that
he will not be caught. See, e.g., Calfee & Craswell, supra note 4, at 979. Scholars have gone
beyond this basic uncertainty about detection and prosecution to consider the effect of other
sorts of uncertainty upon the incentives created by a rule of substantive law. See id. at 974-84,
986-89 (describing the effect on deterrence of uncertainty regarding a court's views on duty
of care and damages); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92
YALE L.J. 799, 805-06 (1983) (discussing the effect on deterrence of uncertainty over the
precaution level that courts will require). Also, scholarship has considered the effects of
inaccurate-versus-accurate litigation upon deterrence incentives. See Louis Kaplow, The Value
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In reality, however, the procedural rules governing litigation may provide
incentives as powerful as those provided by substantive rules. In fact, nonmerits
factors often drive litigation and settlement. As explained below, litigation rules
may affect the value of a lawsuit by determining the costs of litigation.34 This Part
first discusses the dynamics of litigation and settlement generally, and then
focuses on the combined effect of discovery and non-fee-shifting rules on
litigation costs. These rules together lead to litigation expenses that are
unreasonably high, are beyond a party's control, and are borne regardless of the
merits. As a result, legal costs may overshadow the merits when plaintiffs decide
to file, and parties decide to settle, lawsuits.
A. The Importance ofLegal Fees in Litigation and
Settlement
The costs of resolving legal disputes are significant. Plaintiffs' attorneys
typically work for a contingent fee35 equal to about one-third of their clients'
recovery. 6 Because defense attorneys usually charge by the hour, their fees
depend upon the course of litigation, such as the extent of pretrial motion practice
and discovery, and whether the case proceeds to trial.37 Regardless of whether a
case actually goes to trial, however, legal expenses generally account for a
significant portion of the total amount a defendant expects to pay, particularly in
smaller cases.38

ofAccuracy in Adjudication:An EconomicAnalysis,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); discussion
infra Part IV.A. Moreover, Calabresi has recognized that there may be more to the relationship
between primary and tertiary accident costs than he had explored, implicitly suggesting that
transaction costs may influence deterrence. See CALABRESI, supranote 6, at 29-30 (noting that
differences between the three sets of accident costs may be unclear, and that the three subgoals
of cost reduction may conflict, but arguing nevertheless that the division of accident costs is
"useful for analytical purposes"). The scholarship has not, however, considered the effect of
litigation rules on deterrence incentives in a systematic way.
34. Procedural rules regarding the choice of forum and factfinder also affect the value of
lawsuits by altering the likelihood of prevailing at trial. This Article leaves those procedural
rules for another day and confines its analysis to rules that influence deterrence through their
effect on costs. This Article also leaves unaddressed the many other variables that might alter
a lawsuit's value, such as the ancillary effects of a pending lawsuit on a defendant's reputation.
35. See Trubek et al., supra note 5, at I11 ("[Seventy-one percent] of plaintiffs in our
sample were represented by lawyers paid on a contingency basis.").
36. Even where the plaintiff's attorney charges by the hour, the fees typically exceed 20%
of the plaintiff's recovery. See id. (noting that the recovery-to-fee ratio in the case of contingent-fee attorneys averages 3 to I, while in the case of hourly-fee attorneys it averages 3.65 to
I in federal courts and 4.94 to 1 in state courts).
37. See idL at 90, 102, 104 (noting the events of a case as being the most important variable
affecting a lawyer's time, and finding that each side's lawyers spent an average of 30.4 hours
per case, and that a trial adds, on average, 6.7 hours).
38. On average, if a defendant pays less than $10,000 to a plaintiff, he will have to pay an
additional one-third (if in state court) or 85% (if in federal court) to compensate his own
lawyers. See id. at 121 n.85.
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Thus, as a practical matter, legal expenses play a significant role in tort law
deterrence. 9 For a defendant, the threat of a lawsuit includes an outlay not only
to the victim, but also to the defendant's lawyers. For a plaintiff, the decision
whether to file a suit requires a weighing of the expected benefits and anticipated
expenses of litigation. If plaintiffs refrain from filing meritorious suits, or else
settle meritorious suits for less than their merits warrant, defendants who should
be liable will escape liability, and tort law deterrence will be dampened.
However, as Part III will explore, a plaintiffs ability to pay his lawyer a
contingent fee, rather than an hourly fee, may avoid this outcome. Contingent-fee
arrangements enable plaintiffs to avoid both the problem of paying legal bills in
advance of a verdict or settlement and the risk of losing money in the event they
lose the suit.40
The importance of legal fees in tort law deterrence, however, extends beyond
the defendant's anticipated expenses and the plaintiffs decision to initiate

litigation. The costs of litigation also play a major role in the dynamics of
settlement. Fewer than ten percent of lawsuits result in trials, and many legal
disputes are dropped or settled before a complaint is ever filed.4 In practice,
then, deterrence results not only from a defendant's fear of paying a judgment
after trial, but also (and primarily) from the fear of paying a monetary settlement
prior to trial.42
The basic dynamics of litigation and settlement have been thoroughly explored
in law and economics scholarship.4 3 The economic analysis of settlement
dynamics assumes that each party pays his attorney an hourly fee," so that further

39. The theoretical question of whether litigation expenses should be internalized along
with the costs of accidents is addressed infra in Part IV.D.
40. See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the
Contingent Fee in Personal-InjuryLitigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 (1970).
Sociological factors may nevertheless affect a plaintiff's decision to sue. See Galanter, supra
note 1, at 14 ("[H]igher income and white households perceive more problems with the goods
they buy and complain more both to sellers and to third parties than do poor or black
households."). The desire to maintain good continuing relations with a potential defendant may
also affect an injured person's (or business's) decision to sue.
41. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 11-32. Although only about five percent of federal cases
reach trial, another quarter are disposed of by pretrial motions. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The
MisunderstoodConsequences ofModern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631, 636-37 & n. 19

("[J]udges are finally disposing of about a third of their civil cases.") (citing DIVISION

OF

ANALYSIS AND REPORTS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SUMMARY OF CIVIL CASES

1989 TO JUNE 30, 1990).
42. Cf A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The DeterrentEffects of Settlements

TERMINATED FROM JULY 1,

and Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 109, 110 (1988) (arguing that settlements and trials have
different deterrent effects because defendants pay less for settlements).
43. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation,

13 J.LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis
UnderAlternative Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs, 1I J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); see
also William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971)

(discussing settlement dynamics in criminal law).
44. The effect of contingent fees on this analysis is reserved for Part III.
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litigation is costly.4" The theory is that parties will choose to settle a case when
their expectations regarding the verdict differ by less than their combined
expected legal fees. For example, if the plaintiff expects a jury verdict of $5000
and additional legal expenses of $500, and the defendant expects a jury verdict
of $4000 and additional legal expenses of $1000, then the plaintiff would have
an incentive to settle for any amount greater than $4500 ($5000 minus $500) and
the defendant would have an incentive to settle for any amount under $5000
($4000 plus $1000). Within the "settlement range" from $4500 to $5000, each
party will bargain to try to obtain a greater share of the $500 surplus value that
they stand to gain collectively by settling rather than going to trial. (Indeed, such
haggling over the surplus value means the parties do not settle in every instance
where it would be efficient to do so.)
A general increase in expected legal expenses would lead defendants to offer
more and plaintiffs to accept less (because going to trial would be more costly).
And, the greater their combined expected legal expenses, the more likely it is that
a plaintiff and a defendant will settle despite significant differences over the
merits of the case. In fact, so long as their combined expected legal fees (say
$5200) exceed the plaintiff's expected jury verdict (say $5000), they should be
able to reach a settlement even if the defendant views the case as meritless (i.e.,
worth $0).46
Empirical evidence confirms that this possibility is far from remote. For
example, one survey found that in federal cases where the plaintiff ultimately
recovered less than $10,000, the defendant paid attorneys' fees equal to 85% of
the amount paid to plaintiff.47 If plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases received on
average a contingent fee of 33%, then the parties' total fees would generally
exceed the average plaintiff s recovery.48 This evidence suggests that there is a
large subset of cases in which the parties will base settlements almost exclusively
upon legal fees, without regard to the underlying merits.49 Anecdotal evidence

45. The analysis changes when one considers the reality that most tort plaintiffs pay their
lawyers a contingent fee, and that it is these attorneys, rather than the plaintiffs themselves, who
bear the additional costs of going to trial if a case is not settled. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller,
Some Agency Problemsin Settlement, 16 J.LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).
46. See infra Part III.D for a detailed analysis of a plaintiff's incentive to file and a
defendant's incentive to settle a meritless lawsuit.
47. See Trubek et al., supra note 5, at 121 n.85. Presumably, a large portion of these cases
were ones where the potential damage award was much larger than the ultimate settlement
amount, but where the plaintiff was likely to lose. The "amount in controversy" requirement
for diversity jurisdiction (more than $10,000 when Trubek's article was written) suggests that,
at least in the diversity cases, the original complaints sought more than the amount ($10,000
or less) that was ultimately recovered. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (current version at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1997)).
48. See Trubek et al., supranote 5, at 121 n.85.
49. Part III.B discusses how contingent-fee arrangements may cause future litigation
expenses to have different effects on plaintiffs' and defendants' settlement incentives.
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further supports the proposition that the expense of litigation leads defendants to
settle cases they view as meritless5 s
Scholars and practitioners alike have focused on two features of our system of
litigation-liberal discovery and the absence of fee shifting-that lead litigation
costs, and thus settlement amounts, to fail to correspond to a case's underlying
merits. In exploring the effects of liberal discovery and non-fee-shifting rules, it
is important to keep in mind the basic dynamics of litigation and settlement noted
above: plaintiffs decide to sue, and parties decide to settle, based upon their
expectations regarding both the likely verdict and the costs of obtaining a verdict.
Procedural rules can alter the relative importance of each by influencing the size
of expected legal fees relative to the size of the likely verdict, and by determining
who shall bear and control those fees. Ultimately, discovery and fee-shifting rules
affect what a defendant expects to pay for its conduct in four different ways: (1)
if a case proceeds to trial, the defendant will pay pretrial and trial expenses; (2)
if a case settles, the settlement amount will reflect some of the legal expenses that
the defendant has saved by avoiding trial; (3) even if a case settles, the defendant
nevertheless will incur some presettlement legal expenses; but (4) the cost of
litigation may inhibit some plaintiffs from filing suits in the first place and may
encourage others to accept settlements below their expected verdicts (just as it
induces defendants to pay more than their expected verdicts). The literature on
discovery and fee shifting explored below helps to explain why American
litigation is unreasonably costly, but it does not say whether these costs ultimately
burden or benefit defendants.
B. Control over Legal Fees
Tort theory postulates that so long as potential defendants can predict the
injuries they are likely to inflict, they should take reasonable safety precautions."'
In reality, however, the amount that someone must expect to pay for an injury
depends not just on the injury itself, but also on the costs of litigation.
Furthermore, a defendant's expected litigation costs will not necessarily depend
upon the anticipated injuries.
Legal fees constitute the vast bulk of both parties' litigation expenses,52 and
hourly attorneys report that the most important factors affecting their time on a
case are (in descending order of importance): (1) the events in the case
(principally, the extent of motions and discovery); (2) the type of court (federal
being more expensive than state); 3 (3) the client's goals; (4) the lawyer's goals

50. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note I, at 10-11 & nn.30-37 (citing media reports of meritless
law suits). Part III.D discusses in greater detail plaintiffs' incentives to file (or forego) and
defendants' incentives to settle (or litigate) meritless lawsuits.
51. See supra Part I.
52. See Trubek et al., supra note 5, at 91 (reporting that "[p]ayments to lawyers constitute]
99% of out-of-pocket litigation expenses for individual clients and 98% for organizations").
53. Higher legal fees in federal court may be attributable, in part, to: (1) the "amount in
controversy" requirement for diversity actions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), which may lead
to higher average damages demands in federal court, (2) the time spent litigating federal court
jurisdiction (removal and remand), and (3) the extra time required to fulfill the potentially
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(e.g., professional visibility); and (5) the case's characteristics (stakes and
complexity).' Accordingly, even if a potential defendant can predict and control
the type of injury he may inflict, this information will rank only fifth in
importance in determining the legal costs he is likely to pay. The defendant may
be able to influence the other factors to some extent: his own goals are within his
control, as are those of the lawyer he retains. He may also be able to anticipate
being sued in federal court, based upon the nature of the offense he will commit
(subject matter jurisdiction) or the location of his potential victims (diversity
jurisdiction). 5 However, the most important factor affecting the defendant's legal
costs-the extent of motions and discovery-are at least equally under the control
of the plaintiff. 6 Accordingly, a defendant's expected legal costs may depend as
much upon litigation tactics of opposing counsel as upon the anticipated injury.
Putting aside their cost, both liberal discovery and motion practice tend to
promote the accurate resolution of legal disputes and to foster settlements that
focus upon the merits of a case. Therefore, discovery and motion practice should
lead defendants to base their expectations regarding liability upon the relevant
substantive law.5 Discovery and motions practice 5 an be quite expensive,
however, and the costs of discovery, in particular, are a popular subject of
discussion among practitioners, politicians, and scholars.59 Law and economics

higher expectations of federal judges.
54. See Trubek et al., supra note 5, at 102.

55. A plaintiff can always avoid removal on diversity grounds, however, by filing a suit in
the defendant's home state. See 28 U.S.C § 1441(b) (1994). Of course, the choice of federal
or state court, and of the locality of the suit, may bear upon the finder of fact's likely verdict,
as well as upon the costs of litigation. Parties may therefore choose fora in the hope that the
choice of a particular forum will improve their chances of winning.
56. It should be noted that contingent-fee plaintiffs' attorneys reported allocating their time
based upon (1) the events of the case, and (2) the case's characteristics. See Trubek et al., supra
note 5, at 104, 108. To the extent that the defendant's attorney's fees will depend upon the time
spent by the plaintiff's lawyers (in filing motions and discovery requests), the case's
characteristics ultimately will have a greater impact upon the defense lawyer's time than is
reflected in its ranking of fifth.
57. But cf George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments ofFairnessandPretrial

Bargaining,22 J.LEGAL STuD. 135, 158-59 (1993) (noting that the psychological tendency to
view information with a self-serving bias may undermine discovery's effectiveness as a tool
to promote settlement).
58. Less attention has been devoted to the parties' respective abilities to inflict legal costs
on one another through motion practice, and in particular, to the unequal time it may take to
respond to an opponent's motion. One study has found, however, that while all attorneys spend
time responding to their opponent's briefs, contingent-fee attorneys (predominately for
plaintiffs) spend half as much time as do hourly attorneys (typically their opponents). See
Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact ofFee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, L. & Soc'Y REV.
251, 271 (1985). As this difference between plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys is largely
attributable to contingent fees, it is reserved for discussion infra in Part III.
59. See sources cited supra note 2. Discovery is one of the more important factors affecting
legal costs. See Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521,

1544 (1993) (quoting Chief Judge Robert Parker, the Chair of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, who claimed that excessive

discovery was the single greatest factor contributing to unacceptable cost); Trubek et al., supra
note 5, at 91 (indicating that lawyers on average spend 16.7% of their time on discovery, a
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scholarship has worked out in detail the basic reasons for why discovery costs are
unreasonably high.6" First, each party can improve its settlement position by
increasing its opponent's anticipated legal costs.6' As noted above, the greater the
anticipated legal expense, the more eager a party will be to settle. Second,
because it takes more time to comply with a discovery request than to make such
a request, each party can inflict extra expense upon its opponent by making broad
discovery requests.62 Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state rules
of procedure do not shift the costs of compliance to the party requesting
discovery.63 A party thus can improve its settlement position by making
burdensome discovery requests, even if the information it hopes to gain is of little
advantage.
The overall costs of discovery may therefore exceed the overall benefits,' 4 as
each party gains not only from the information it receives through discovery, but
also from the legal costs that discovery requests impose upon an opponent.
Moreover, even where discovery is honestly intended to obtain information, and
not to burden the opponent, a party nevertheless may make requests that are not
cost justified, that is, requests it would not choose to make were it to bear the
costs of compliance.65 Each party simply lacks incentives to weigh the costs and
benefits of its discovery requests because these costs are not internalized.66

percentage greater than that spent on any other single activity).
60. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 435 (1994); Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and
Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481 (1994); Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal
Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982).
61. See supra Part II.A.

62. This is true of document productions and interrogatories. On the other hand, a lawyer
taking a deposition may spend more time preparing than does the lawyer defending it. Also,
if the deposed witness is an employee of one of the parties, the employee's time must be
included in the costs of compliance.
63. See generallyFED. R Civ. P. 26-37 (discovery rules); Edward F. Sherman, A Process
Model and Agendafor Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1566-70

(1994) (comparing reform possibilities for discovery in state and federal courts).
64. Bruce Hay points out that private incentives and social incentives may differ, and that
even if a discovery request does not increase the value of the requesting party's claim
sufficiently to justify its cost, the request may nevertheless be socially efficient if it induces
defendants to take precautions against inflicting harm. See Hay, supra note 60, at 483. Hay
goes on to explain, however, that.fine-tuning discovery rules in order to achieve a socially
optimal level of discovery is quite difficult: "A rule allowing an apparently ideal amount of
discovery may backfire if it leads the parties to settle without undertaking discovery." Id. at
514.
65. Cooter and Rubinfeld distinguish between discovery "misuse," which occurs "when
compliance costs more than the expected increase in the value of the requesting party's claim,"
and "abuse," which they define as knowing "misuse." Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 60, at
437.
66. Surveys have found widespread dissatisfaction with the costs of discovery. See, e.g.,
Louis HARRIs & Assocs., INC., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYsTEM at iv
(1989). However, several scholars have questioned the accuracy of the belief shared by
politicians, corporations, the media, the public, and even lawyers and judges that discovery
abuse pervades our system of litigation. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 1, at 1396; Paul R.
Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, ProposedChanges to Discovery Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform":
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Discovery is supposed to be kept in check by each party's fear that if it makes
unduly burdensome requests, the other side will either obtain sanctions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) or retaliate with its own burdensome
requests. In practice, however, the imposition of discovery sanctions is highly
unusual and generally is triggered only by knowingly and patently abusive
requests that are intended to impose costs rather than to obtain needed information.67 Moreover, the threat of retaliation often does not limit discovery until it
has already exceeded reasonable levels; it may take several rounds of escalated
discovery requests before the parties try to reach a genuine agreement to limit
discovery.68
Our discovery rules, then, increase litigation costs by providing neither
incentives nor adequate court supervision to ensure that discovery requests are
cost justified.69 Of course, the prospect of unreasonably high discovery costs

Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (1993). For purposes of this Article,
it is unimportant whether parties are purposely abusing discovery in order to improve their
settlement positions, or are innocently engaging in excessive discovery because the rules
provide inadequate economic incentives for them to refrain from doing so. The Article's aim
is simply to discuss how discovery rules may affect the amount that potential defendants expect
to pay for their conduct (i.e., by influencing the rate at which plaintiffs file and litigate lawsuits,
and the amount it costs defendants to defend and settle them).
67. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(2)(C) provides that requests not be
"unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, and the amount in controversy, and the importance of issues at stake
in the litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2)(C). In practice, however, this rule is rarely enforced,
particularly in cases where the requesting party honestly intends to obtain information, and
merely neglects to consider the costs that will be borne by his opponent. See C. RONALD
ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE 96-102 (1978); 8 CHARLEs ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2052, at 630 (2d ed. 1994); Wayne D.
Brazil, Views from the FrontLines: Observationsby Chicago Lawyers About the System of

Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 245.
To succeed in reducing substantially the costs of litigation, one must identify the
practices and rules that encourage discovery abuse, and modify them to encourage
responsibly limited discovery. Well-intentioned directives, threats of punishment,
and calls for less adversary behavior can have no significant effect upon the
underlying causes of discovery abuse.
Abraham D. Sofaer, SanctioningAttorneysfor DiscoveryAbuse Under the New FederalRules:
On the Limited Utility ofPunishment,57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 680, 720 (1983).

68. The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discarded the provision,
previously contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), that upon either party's motion,
the judge must schedule a conference and issue a discovery plan "setting limitations on
discovery, if any." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (prior to 1993 amendment).
69. The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure included significant
amendments to the rules governing discovery. See generally DONNA STEINSTRA, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, wrH SPECIFIC

ATmNION TO COuRTs' RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS IN FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 26 (1994). First, "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order

or local rule," the rules now require automatic disclosure of discoverable information "relevant
to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). Second,
the new rules set presumptive limits on the numbers of depositions (10) and interrogatories (25)
that a party may request without leave of the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A),
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might lead parties to settle some cases prior to discovery.70 In such cases, the
plaintiff and defendant would settle based upon prediscovery estimates of the
value of a case. In theory, if the parties agreed on the case's value (and did not
engage in strategic behavior) they could avoid entirely the costs of discovery and
could settle the case for its estimated value. Thus, in theory, the flaws in our
system of discovery outlined above would not skew deterrence at all. The
prospect of high discovery costs would not inhibit plaintiffs from filing
meritorious suits, since plaintiffs would expect to avoid those costs by settling
early. Likewise, defendants would expect to avoid high discovery costs by
settling early. Accordingly, defendants would expect to settle suits for the fair
value of the injuries in question.
Unfortunately, this hypothetical scenario-in which the parties agree upon a
case's value before discovery and thereby save the costs of discovery-is unlikely
to arise in practice. One of discovery's most basic purposes is to enable the
parties to evaluate the merits of a case. Discovery's free exchange of information
increases the likelihood that parties will view a case similarly. Accordingly,
before discovery, the parties will be less likely to agree on a case's merits. As a
result, either of the following two scenarios is more likely to arise in practice than
the hypothetical scenario described above.
First, the parties may devote significant resources to discovery before they can
reach a settlement. (As noted above, the rules governing discovery are such that
the parties do not have incentives to keep this discovery within reasonable
limits.7") To the extent that plaintiffs and defendants anticipate paying significant
litigation costs before settling, deterrence incentives may be skewed: anticipated
costs may inhibit plaintiffs from filing meritorious cases in the first place, thereby
allowing defendants that should be liable to avoid any penalty; or, if plaintiffs do
file suit, defendants will expect to pay significant litigation expenses on top of
settlement amounts, even with regard to meritless cases.
Alternatively, the parties may decide that, despite significant disagreement over
the merits, they nevertheless will settle before discovery because their expected
litigation costs are so large as to exceed the difference between their expected
verdicts. This will not, however, ensure accurate deterrence. To settle despite
wide disagreement, the defendant and the plaintiff must depart significantly from
their views of the merits-paying higher and receiving lower settlements,
respectively, than they believe the merits warrant. Unlike the hypothetical parties

31 (a)(2)(A), 33(a). However, about half of the federal districts have opted out of these new
rules under Rule 26(b)(2). See Mullenix, supra note 1, at 1444 (observing that 48 out of 94
districts have opted out) (citing New Discovery Rules, 62 U.S.L.W. 2449, 2450 (Jan. 25,
1994)). Moreover, the new rules do not limit requests for document production, a discovery
device that can be quite costly.
70. See Hay, supra note 60, at 510.
71. It is worth noting that where a case does not settle, the costs of pretrial activities, such
as discovery and settlement negotiations, generally exceed the costs of trial. See Trubek et al.,
supra note 5, at 91, 104 (noting that in cases that proceed to trial, attorneys spend less than
10% of their time preparing for and attending the trial). Accordingly, even if liberal discovery
is credited with increasing settlement rates, it is unlikely that the saved trial expenses would
exceed the unreasonably high costs of discovery described in the text above.
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above, who each believed he could save litigation costs entirely by settling,
parties who disagree about a case's value, but settle anyway to save large
litigation costs, will believe that they have borne, rather than saved, the greater
part of litigation costs. And, if plaintiffs and defendants both expect ex ante to
settle cases ex post for amounts that do not reflect their true value, deterrence
may be skewed: defendants will expect plaintiffs to forego meritorious cases72 and
will expect to pay too much for meritless ones.
Of course, where the parties disagree so significantly, and each believes that he
has settled for an unfair amount simply to avoid litigation costs, the parties'
divergent predictions regarding the verdict cannot both be correct. Although both
parties may believe that they have borne litigation costs (by settling for an unfair
amount), in reality they will have saved those costs." These saved costs will not,
however, automatically result in accurate settlements. Where parties disagree
significantly over the merits, the settlement process will move them toward a
middle point determined as much by their future legal expenses (i.e., who is more
reluctant to proceed) and their relative bargaining strengths, as by the merits of
their positions. Resulting settlements are likely to be too high or too low.74
Returning to defendants' ex ante incentives, if litigation expenses and
bargaining power drive litigation and settlement decisions, with the legal merits
playing a secondary role, then defendants may either expect to pay too little for
their conduct (if plaintiffs forego meritorious suits or settle for too little) or else
to pay too much for their conduct (if they expect to be sued and to pay excessive
settlements). In sum, whether the parties choose to settle early or to litigate fully,
America's discovery rules may skew deterrence incentives by substituting
expenses for merits as the driving force behind litigation and settlement
dynamics.

72. True, the prospect of settling a case for a profit, albeit for less than it is worth, should
not inhibit plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. However, in deciding whether to file a lawsuit,
plaintiffs must weigh the likelihood of several different possible outcomes, including winning
or losing ajury verdict, or obtaining a large or small settlement. To the extent that plaintiffs
expect the prospect of high litigation costs to force them to accept lower settlements, this may
alter their calculus and lead them to forego some meritorious lawsuits, which will ultimately
allow some liable defendants to escape responsibility. Of course the availability of contingentfee arrangements discussed in Part IIwill affect this analysis.
73. Of course, lawyers working for a contingent fee still get paid. See discussion infra Part
III (addressing the effect of contingent-fee arrangements, which typically provide for a
percentage of the plaintiffs recovery regardless of when the case settles, on the parties'
behavior).
74. See Brazil, supra note 67, at 225 (noting empirical evidence that "the projected expense
of responding to and conducting discovery more than occasionally pressured [attorneys] to
advise a client to accept a settlement even though they knew the case was underdeveloped and
even though they suspected that an opponent possessed relevant information that they had not
yet discovered").
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C. Fee Shifting

This effect of liberal discovery, however, and the dynamics of litigation and
settlement described thus far, depend upon a second American rule that requires
each party to bear its own legal fees. 5 If implemented in the United States, fee
shifting would change the dynamics of litigation and settlement.76
Most obviously, a fee-shifting rule (such as prevails in the English system)
largely eliminates the disjunction between the costs of a lawsuit to a defendant
and the likelihood of winning at trial, as the defendant pays nothing at all if he
wins. The prospect of fee shifting also alters settlement dynamics. As noted
above, parties will settle as long as their verdict estimates differ by less than their
expected legal fees, so that the saved costs of avoiding a trial exceed the expected
return of going to trial. 77 In a fee-shifting regime, however, if the plaintiff and the
defendant disagree over the likely verdict, this difference will be reflected in their
expected legal fees as well. 7 ' Accordingly, any gap between their settlement
positions will widen.79 In the anticipation of recouping the costs of continued

75. Some statutory exceptions to this rule are designed to encourage the filing of lawsuits.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (providing for one-way fee shifting in favor of prevailing
civil rights plaintiffs); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (1980) (same).
76. See, e.g., John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, andLitigation, or I'll Be Suing You,

18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); Avery Katz, Measuringthe Demandfor Litigation: Is the
English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143 (1987); Shavell, supra note 43;
Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154 (1992). This latter note deals with two

of the three cost-related procedures addressed by this Article.
For general discussions of the English and American rules, see, for example, Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Predictingthe Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1984, at 139 [hereinafter Predictingthe Effects] (summarizing major likely effects of fee
shifting); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651; Murray L. Schwartz, Foreword,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,

Winter 1984, at I (introducing symposium on fee shifting that includes articles on the history
of the American rule, on comparisons to Canadian and European systems, and on the effects
of fee shifting on litigants' incentives); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The InjuredPerson'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).

For a discussion of a fee-shifting rule based upon the strength of a claim, rather than simply
upon whether it prevails, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis ofFee
ShiftingBased on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, MeritoriousSuits, andthe Role
of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1996). Bebchuk and Chang's article is discussed infra in
Part V.
77. See discussion supra Part II.A.
78. See Shavell, supra note 43, at 64-65.
79. For simplicity, consider a lawsuit in which the amount of the victim's damages (say,

$10,000) is clear and the only disagreement is over liability. Further assume that each party
believes that it has a 60% chance of prevailing (i.e., the plaintiff believes there is a 60% chance,
and the defendant believes there is a 40% chance, that the plaintiff will prevail). If the
plaintiffs and the defendant's expected costs of going to trial are $1200 each, then in the
American system the parties should settle, since the saved costs of going to trial ($1200 +
$1200 = $2400), would exceed the $2000 difference in their expected jury verdicts (60% of
$10,000, or $6000, versus 40% of $10,000, or $4000). Looking at each side individually, the
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litigation, optimistic parties can refrain from settling a lawsuit for amounts they
would otherwise accept in a non-fee-shifting regime. And, plaintiffs deciding
whether to file lawsuits in the first place will know ex ante that optimistic
defendants will be more willing to proceed to trial (and to spend more with the
expectation of recouping litigation expenses).80 Indeed, from the outset, feeshifting systems encourage stronger lawsuits, and discourage weaker ones, by
rewarding victorious claims and imposing a penalty for those that lose.8 ' In
theory, then, a potential defendant's total tort payments should depend more upon
substantive law in a fee-shifting regime than it would in an American system
where each party bears its own legal fees.82
A related rule regarding offers of settlement likewise ensures that merits play
a primary role in settlement and litigation dynamics where there is doubt not only

plaintiff would be willing to settle for an amount exceeding $4800 (his $6000 expected verdict
minus $1200 saved legal costs) and the defendant would be willing to settle for up to $5200
(his $4000 expected verdict plus $1200 saved legal costs). Under the English system, however,
the plaintiff would expect to receive $10,000 and pay nothing if he wins (an outcome that he
expects is 60% likely) and to receive nothing and pay both parties' legal costs of $2400 if he
loses (an outcome that he expects is 40% likely). Accordingly, the plaintiffs expected gain
from going to trial would be $6000 (60% of $10,000) minus $960 (40% of $2400), or $5040.
The defendant would expect to pay nothing if he wins (which he views as 60% likely), and to
pay a $10,000 verdict plus both parties' legal costs of $2400 if he loses (which he views as
40% likely). Accordingly, the defendant's expected loss from going to trial is $4960 (40% of
$12,400). In theory, then, the parties will not settle, as the lowest amount the plaintiff would
be willing to accept ($5040) is greater than the highest amount that the defendant would be
willing to pay ($4960) to avoid trial.
80. Because the English fee-shifting rule increases the stakes of winning or losing a lawsuit,
it will encourage both parties to spend more money trying to win a case, and will especially
encourage the party with the stronger case to spend more (in the hope of winning
reimbursement from his opponent). See Hause, supra note 76, at 158, 167-68; Katz, supra note
76, at 144; Smith, supra note 76, at 2155. This additional spending, by increasing the costs of
not settling, may actually make settlement more likely under the English rule than under the
American rule, even though the English rule otherwise tends to widen the gap between the
parties' settlement positions. See Hause, supra note 76, at 172; Katz, supra note 76, at 144;
11
Smith, supra note 76, at 2155.
81. See Rowe, Predictingthe Effects, supra note 76, at 152; Shavell, supra note 43, at 59.

Moreover, a plaintiff deciding whether to file a weak lawsuit will know no only that he must
bear the defendant's legal costs if he loses, but also that the defendant will spend more to
defend the case. The defendant's increased efforts may further hurt the plaintiff's (already
weak) chances of winning, in addition to increasing the plaintiff's likely expenses if he
ultimately does lose. See Hause, supra note 76, at 168.
82. Risk aversion, however, may complicate the above analysis, changing the rate at which
plaintiffs file meritorious and meritless lawsuits under the English fee-shifting rule. See
Shavell, supranote 43, at 62; cf Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 76, at 378-80 (discussing effect
of uncertainty on plaintiffs incentives under American and English rules). While risk aversion
may lead plaintiffs to forego meritorious lawsuits even under an American rule, the English feeshifting rule aggravates this problem. By guaranteeing the prevailing plaintiff a higher
recovery, and the losing plaintiff a greater loss, the English fee-shifting rule increases the stakes
of litigation. The fear of paying their opponents' legal fees, in addition to their own, may lead
risk-averse plaintiffs to forego suits they would otherwise file under the American system.
Because contingent-fee arrangements help plaintiffs to manage litigation risk, a more complete
discussion of the effects of risk aversion is reserved for Part III, infra.
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about who will win, but also about the size of damages. By making the plaintiff
bear all postoffer legal fees if the verdict falls short of the defendant's settlement
offer, the English system enables a defendant that is willing to pay the true cost
of the injury in question to avoid exorbitant legal fees.13 Indeed, when evaluating
the costs and benefits of a risky activity ex ante, if the defendant is able to predict
the injuries that he may cause, he need not speculate further on the legal fees he
might incur to litigate and settle lawsuits based on such injuries.
The ability of a fee-shifting rule to focus the parties on the merits underscores
the failure of the American system to encourage accurate settlements. By refusing
to shift attorneys' fees, the U.S. system of litigation forces parties to bear
litigation expenses without regard to the merits. Moreover, in calculating
anticipated legal fees, parties must take into account the power (described above)
that opponents have to escalate these fees through discovery requests and motion
practice. Because the United States has chosen both to allow liberal discovery
without providing close court supervision or private incentives to reduce costs,
and to deny the prevailing party any reimbursement for legal fees from the losing
party, each litigant must face unreasonably high litigation costs that are beyond
its control, regardless of the merits of its position.
Although these characteristics of American litigation may skew deterrence,
America's approaches to discovery and fee shifting do not alone guarantee that
deterrence will be skewed in any particular direction. In some instances, high
litigation costs could lead plaintiffs to forego meritorious claims or to settle them
for too little, and thereby allow defendants to escape responsibility where they
should be liable.84 In other instances, where plaintiffs decide to sue and to reject
low settlement offers, America's litigation rules may lead defendants to pay more
for their conduct than they would in a costless system of litigation, and to pay
significant amounts for weak, and even meritless, cases. Unfortunately, a third
subset of cases-those in which defendants pay exactly what the merits
warrant-is likely to be quite small. This is true because, as noted earlier, parties
are less likely to agree on a case's merits before discovery, and thereby will have
difficulty settling early and sharing the saved costs of litigation. Even if the
parties do settle before conducting expensive discovery, the resulting settlement

83. A defendant need only pay in to the court the amount it is offering in settlement. See
HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING 111 (1987); Vargo, supra note 76, at 1611. Regarding

proposals to apply a similar rule to settlement offers in the United States, see infra Part V
(discussing David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1994), and Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93 (1986)).

84. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 42, at 112 ("Because litigation is costly, not
every individual who suffers harm will bring suit."). Under Polinsky and Rubenfeld's model,
settlements result in underdeterrence if litigation expenses lead plaintiffs to forego meritorious
suits and/or defendants pay less than victims' injuries. See id. at 109-10. The analysis in Part
III infra of the combined effect of discovery rules, non-fee-shifting, and contingent-fee
arrangements essentially explains why these assumptions do not hold true! contingent-fee
attorneys do accept and litigate even small cases where the costs of litigating to trial outweigh
the expected verdict, see infra Part III.A, and plaintiffs' bargaining power is sufficiently strong
to ensure that defendants' settlement payments together with their presettlement litigation
expenses do not generally fall short of plaintiffs' injuries, see infra Part III.B-C.
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may strike a random compromise based on bargaining power and future legal
expenses, rather than reflect accurately the merits of a case. Accordingly, because
early settlements are likely to be too high or low, they do not ensure accurate
deterrence.
III. THE AVAILABILITY OF CONTINGENT-FEE
ARRANGEMENTS

Although liberal discovery and non-fee-shifting rules lead to unreasonably high
litigation costs that are beyond a party's control, and that the parties must be bear
regardless of the merits, they do not inherently lead defendants to expect to pay
more or less for their conduct than they would under substantive law alone. As
noted above, the ultimate cost to defendants will depend on whether plaintiffs
pursue or forego litigation and on the parties' relative bargaining strengths and
litigation costs. The discussion below demonstrates that each of these factors
depends on whether the plaintiff is permitted to pay his attorney a contingent, as
opposed to an hourly, fee. When contingent-fee arrangements are added into the
mix, it becomes clear that defendants do indeed pay more for tort suits than their
collective merits warrant.
In America, but not in England, a client may pay his lawyer a percentage fee
that is contingent upon the success of the case. 5 The availability of contingentfee arrangements influences the rate at which plaintiffs file tort claims, the
bargaining power plaintiffs bring to settlement negotiations, and the ability of an
attorney-client team to handle unreasonably high litigation expenses. The
discussion below first addresses the possibility of underdeterrence-that is, a
potential defendant's expectation of escaping liability for meritorious lawsuits or
paying inordinately low settlements. Subparts A and B demonstrate that the
availability of contingent-fee arrangements increases both the rate at which
plaintiffs file meritorious claims and the amounts for which these claims settle.
Subparts C and D then turn to the problem of overdeterrence, demonstrating that
in addition to paying for plaintiffs' injuries in meritorious cases, defendants
cannot avoid paying both significant presettlement litigation costs in meritorious
cases and significant amounts to defend and/or settle meritless suits. Ultimately,
when the effects of contingent-fee arrangements are considered together with the
effects of the discovery and non-fee-shifting rules outlined above, the result is a
litigation system that predictably leads defendants to pay more for their conduct
than they would under substantive law alone.

85. For an argument that contingent fees should be calculated differently, see Lester
Brickman, ContingentFees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?,
37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 34 (1989) (advocating fee based on "lawyer's anticipated effort;
estimated risk of nonrecovery; settlement value of the case; and the risk premium to be added
to the lawyer's opportunity cost, to compensate for the risk the lawyer undertakes").
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A. ContingentFees and the Decision to File a
MeritoriousLawsuit
Practitioners and scholars generally agree that the availability of contingent-fee
arrangements in America increases the rate at which plaintiffs file lawsuits.86 The
basic reasons for this increase are fairly straightforward. First, contingent-fee
arrangements eliminate the plaintiff's risk of a financial loss if the suit fails.
Second, contingent-fee arrangements eliminate the plaintiffs need to pay a
retainer fee or hourly bills in advance of any cash verdict or settlement.8 As a
result, plaintiffs have an incentive to sue whenever they can find an attorney
willing to proceed on a contingent-fee basis.
Third, unlike their clients, attorneys can pursue many lawsuits at one time, and
spread the risk of losing any particular suit over the sum of lawsuits in their
caseload. Thus, attorneys tend to be less risk averse than their clients, and are
willing to proceed for a contingent fee in many cases that plaintiffs would
otherwise forego.88
A system allowing contingent-fee arrangements therefore has the beneficial
effect of enabling nonaffluent, risk-averse plaintiffs to file meritorious lawsuits
where they otherwise would not.89 And, such a system therefore reduces the
likelihood that a potential tortfeasor will expect to avoid liability despite
violating the law.
Indeed, the availability of contingent-fee arrangements may help plaintiffs
pursue meritorious suits even more than would a fee-shifting regime." As noted
above, in theory, fee-shifting rules should link the expected costs of litigation to
the merits of a case, and thereby encourage plaintiffs to file and litigate
meritorious lawsuits. However, in practice, the fear of bearing all legal fees may
lead a risk-averse party to forego a meritorious claim, or to settle it for an amount
that is significantly less than the amount the case would be worth in a costless,

86. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, ContingentFeesfor Lawyers: The
Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 381, 388 (1991); Miller,

supra note 5, at 10-1I; Vargo, supra note 76, at 1617-19.
87. See, e.g., Miceli & Segerson, supra note 86, at 388; Vargo, supra note 76, at 1618.
88. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiationsand the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 349 (1991).
89. Cf Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent FeesPromote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 211, 223-24 (1994) (suggesting that "it might be accurate to say that hourly fees result
in too little litigation, rather than to say that contingent fees result in too much litigation");
Rowe, Predictingthe Effects, supra note 76, at 153.
90. For a discussion of a system that provides both for fee shifting and contingent-fee
arrangements, see Smith, supranote 76.
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accurate legal system. 9 Moreover, most tort plaintiffs, who may already have
financial difficulties due to their injuries, tend to be risk averse. 92
One might question, however, the extent to which a contingent-fee system may
induce plaintiffs to file small, meritorious lawsuits. Even if the costs of future
litigation are borne by the attorney, rather than the client, will the attorney not be
deterred from proceeding when those costs are likely to be high, to be subject to
the other party's control, and to be borne regardless of the merits? An attorney
will be willing to accept a case for a contingent fee only if he expects his fee of
one-third of the recovery93 to exceed his opportunity cost. If the likely verdict in
a case does not exceed three times the value of the time it would take the attorney
to litigate the case, the attorney could not hope to profit from a trial. This
generally means that the expected return on small cases does not outweigh the
attorney's opportunity cost.
However, even where an attorney could not possibly profit by litigating the suit
to a verdict, the attorney may nevertheless hope to profit from an early settlement.
The question that arises, then, is whether defendants might reasonably be induced
to settle small cases. If the defendant knows that the plaintiff's attorney would
lose money by litigating the case to its conclusion, the defendant would be wise
94
to "sit tight" and hope that the plaintiff's attorney simply drops the case.
A recent article demonstrates that, because the parties may settle at any point
during a lawsuit, a plaintiffs attorney may hope to profit even if the expected
verdict would not justify the time it would take him to litigate the suit to a
conclusion.95 For simplicity, consider a hypothetical lawsuit in which everyone
agrees that the plaintiff is 75% likely to win an $800 verdict (and otherwise will
lose). The case would be worth $200 to a plaintiffs' attorney working for a
contingent fee of one-third of any recovery (i.e., one-third of 75% of $800).
Further imagine that the litigation process were such that the parties either had to

91. See Vargo, supra note 76, at 1609-13 (citing GENN, supranote 83, at 98-113, 167-69).
In practice, about 99% of English lawsuits are settled before trial. See id. at 1612. In America,
the settlement rate is thought to be a bit lower. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 1, at 21 (7% of
surveyed cases went to trial); Trubek et al., supranote 5, at 89 (less than 8%of sample went
to trial); see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of ProductLiability
Claims and Compensationfor Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STuD. 321, 329 (1986) (95% of

10,000 products liability suits settled).
92. See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra, note 88, at 349, 384; Vargo, supranote 76, at 1594.
93. Litigation expenses may be paid out of the plaintiff's award either before or after the
attorney's one-third fee is calculated. See Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving
on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 532 n.3 (1978). Even if it is agreed that
expenses are to be borne by the client (and to come out of the client's share of the award in
case of victory), as a practical matter, attorneys do not seek reimbursement of expenses where
the plaintiff receives nothing. See id.
94. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J.LEGAL
STUD. 437, 438 (1988).
95. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerningthe CredibilityandSuccess of

Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). Bebehuk considers plaintiffs' incentives to file,
and defendants' incentives to settle, "negative-expected-value" ("NEV") suits (i.e., suits with
expected returns to plaintiffs that are lower than the expected costs of litigation). Although the
text focuses on small cases, a lawsuit may have a NEV despite large potential damages, if the
likelihood of winning is slim and the costs of litigation are high. See id. at 1.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 73:59

settle at the beginning of the lawsuit, or not settle at all-that is, if the defendant
refused to settle immediately, the plaintiff's attorney could not hope for a later
settlement. Rather he would have to decide either to litigate the case to a verdict
or else to drop it. In this hypothetical world, if the plaintiff's attorney expected
to devote $300 worth of time to litigate the suit to a conclusion (and the defendant
were aware of this cost), the attorney would not reasonably accept the case. He
would know that if he did file a complaint, the defendant would wisely refuse to
settle at the outset based upon the reasonable expectation that the plaintiff's
attorney would drop the case instead of litigating it.96
In reality, however, settlement can occur at various points in the litigation.
Parties may settle before any complaint is filed, after the pleadings but before any
significant discovery, at any time during the discovery process, on the eve of trial,
or even in the midst of trial. And, the plaintiff s attorney may be able to induce
the defendant to settle at any of these points as long as he can maintain a credible
threat to continue with the litigation at all later points.97 Reconsider the simple
hypothetical above, in which the plaintiff's attorney hopes to earn a $200 fee.
Now, however, imagine that the parties may settle either at the start of the case
or on the eve of trial. Further imagine that upon receiving the complaint, the
defendant can envision (1) that it will cost the plaintiff s attorney $150 worth of
time to complete pretrial litigation; and (2) that it will cost the plaintiff's attorney
an additional $150 to try the case. Although the total $300 cost to the plaintiff's
attorney would not justify the $200 expected fee, the plaintiff's attorney might
nevertheless reasonably continue to litigate at each stage, hoping at the outset
either to earn a quick $200 profit by settling immediately, or to settle on the eve
of trial for a $50 profit, but continuing litigation even if the case does not settle,
in the hope of reducing his losses by $50 (from $150 to $100). Because the
plaintiff's attorney could reasonably threaten to continue to litigate at each stage,
the defendant would be wise to settle early and avoid not only the likelihood of
an adverse verdict (worth $600 to him), but also the costs of litigation.
This explanation of why plaintiffs' attorneys would accept small cases for a
contingent fee also could explain why plaintiffs who pay their attorneys an hourly
fee might hope to profit from small cases.9" Recall that a plaintiffs' attorney
working for a contingent fee, at each stage, must expect to recover three times the
value of his future efforts in order credibly to threaten defendants with continued
litigation. Where the plaintiff himself, rather than his attorney, bears the costs and
benefits of future litigation, he need only expect enough to cover his legal
bills-not three times that amount. Accordingly there may be a subset of small
cases in which the attorney would refuse to work for a contingent fee, but the
plaintiff might hope to profit by paying an hourly fee.
Most tort plaintiffs, however, are unlikely to pursue these cases on an hourlyfee basis. Moreover, even in those cases where the attorney and the client could

96. But cf infra Part III.D.3 (discussing attorneys' inability to withdraw where client
wishes to proceed).
97. See Bebchuk, supra note 95, at 4.
98. Indeed, Bebchuk's article focuses on plaintiffs' incentives, rather than those of their
attorneys. See id.
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each hope to profit from either type of fee arrangement, the client (1) is likely to
choose to pay a contingent fee, and (2) might not proceed at all if contingent-fee
arrangements were prohibited. This is because tort plaintiffs are generally more
risk averse than their attorneys (who can spread a loss in any particular case over
the entirety of their caseloads).99 Given that the above strategy-threatening
continued litigation even where a trial would ultimately result in a loss, of
money-is a risky one, plaintiffs' attorneys are better equipped than their clients
to bear the potential costs of this strategy. Moreover, the strategy's success may
require fairly tight control over litigation expenses, so that potential losses are
kept to a minimum. Plaintiffs' attorneys clearly have better control than their
clients over the resources devoted to litigation.
Ultimately, then, the availability of contingent-fee arrangements increases the
rate at which plaintiffs file meritorious lawsuits, both large and small. Granted,
there may remain a small subset of meritorious cases that are small but expensive,
which will not be filed in the absence of a fee-shifting rule. But, as a general
matter, the availability of contingent-fee arrangements alleviates one of the
potential problems caused by America's approaches to discovery and fee-shifting.
In the absence of contingent-fee arrangements, those two sets of rules would
inhibit plaintiffs from filing meritorious lawsuits (for fear of high legal fees,
beyond their control, that the parties must bear regardless of the merits).
However, America's decision to allow contingent-fee arrangements reduces the
number of instances in which plaintiffs forego meritorious lawsuits, and in which
at-fault defendants thereby unjustly avoid liability.
B. ContingentFees andSettlement Dynamics
The prospect of expensive litigation could lead to inadequate deterrence not
only by causing plaintiffs to forego meritorious claims, but also by inducing them
to accept unduly low settlements. Indeed, because individual tort plaintiffs are
typically less affluent and more risk averse than repeat, institutional defendants,
one would expect defendants to capture the greater part of any bargaining surplus
and to settle cases for less than the merits warrant. 00

99. See sources cited supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
100. The fear of paying legal fees, in addition to ajudgment, might also lead a risk-averse
defendant to settle a case for more than it is worth, but institutional defendants are generally
better able to manage risk than are individual plaintiffs. Insurance companies and large
corporations that are repeat players can spread the risk of any single lawsuit over the pool of
lawsuits to which they are parties. They may be willing to assume the risk of losing some trials,
even if that means paying prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys fees, in the hope that they will win
some, and achieve advantageous settlements in others. The risk neutrality of a repeat defendant
provides it with a bargaining advantage over a plaintiff that is risk averse. See Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculationson the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y
Rnv. 95, 98-102 (1974) (noting imbalance of power between one-shot claimants and repeat
defendants, but also that "personal injury cases... are distinctive in that free entry to the arena
is provided by the contingent fee"); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 38 (1996) ("Insurance
companies, government, and big business--the true defendants in almost all cases-are repeat
players."); Vargo, supra note 76, at 1609 (citing GENN, supra note 83, at 98-109); cf John C.
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Contingent-fee arrangements, however, help to eliminate the possibility of
underdeterrence by increasing not only the rate at which plaintiffs file tort suits,
but also the settlement amounts in these cases. Contingent-fee arrangements
improve settlements for plaintiffs by managing their litigation risk and helping
plaintiff-attorney teams to cope better than defendant-attorney teams with the
prospect of unreasonably large litigation expenses.
1. Improving Plaintiffs' Bargaining Positions
Most tort plaintiffs, but only a small minority of defendants, pay their lawyers
on a contingent-fee basis.' 0 ' It is generally accepted that these contingent-fee
arrangements help to correct imbalances in the negotiating positions of plaintiffs
and defendants. 2 Indeed, by enabling an individual plaintiff to shift some of the
risk of litigation to his or her attorney, a contingent-fee arrangement helps to level
the playing field in a lawsuit against an institutional defendant, such as an
insurance company, that is willing and able to risk high litigation costs and an
adverse judgment in an attempt to obtain a better settlement or verdict. Unlike an
individual plaintiff, a plaintiffs' attorney-like a repeat defendant-can spread
the risk of losing any particular lawsuit over the numerous suits in his case load.
2. Increasing Settlement Amounts by Decreasing
Plaintiffs' Relative Litigation Expenses
Contingent-fee arrangements may increase settlement amounts in an additional
way. As noted above, settlements depend not only on the merits, but also upon the
relative costs to the defendant and plaintiff of proceeding. Contingent-fee
arrangements increase settlement amounts by reducing the resources that
plaintiffs devote to litigation.0 3
Plaintiffs themselves do not bear the marginal cost of future litigation-that is,
motion practice, discovery, or trial practice. Rather, their lawyers do. But, for
now, consider the client and attorney as a unit, and examine the attorney-client
team's joint handling of litigation costs."' As an empirical matter, hourly defense

Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunteris Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 231 (1983) (noting that "[a]lthough defendants
also may be risk averse, their greater size, financial resources, and ability to insure or seek
indemnification creates an imbalance-which predictably tilts the bargaining power in their
favor").
101. See Trubek et al., supra note 5, at 94 (stating the authors' study found that 71% of
plaintiffs' attorneys, but only 41% of all attorneys, were paid on a contingent-fee basis); Vargo,
supra note 76, at 1618 (noting that 97% of personal injury plaintiffs utilize contingent-fee
arrangements); Smith, supra note 76, at 2162 n.31 (stating that 97% of lawyers accept personal
injury cases only on a contingent-fee basis).
102. See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra note 88, at 349-50.
103. Recall that 97% of personal injury plaintiffs hire their lawyers on a contingent-fee basis.
See Vargo, supra note 76, at 1618.
104. Many have questioned whether contingent-fee arrangements align clients and lawyers'
interests better than do hourly-fee arrangements. See Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid
What They're Worth? ContingentFees and the Settlement Process,20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187,
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attorneys generally spend twice as much time as contingent-fee plaintiffs'
attorneys in responding to their opponents' motions. 5 This makes sense, given
that plaintiffs' attorneys working under contingent-fee arrangements bear the
opportunity cost of arty time they spend on a-particular case, while defense
attorneys are compensated for each hour they work. In effect, contingent-fee
arrangements provide lawyers with an incentive to hold down the expense of
litigation-which they can do more effectively than clients-and thereby enable
plaintiff-attorney teams to handle escalated litigation costs better than defendantattorney teams.
As a result, such arrangements improve plaintiffs' settlement position by
making future litigation less costly for plaintiff-attorney teams than for
defendants. Indeed, to the extent that plaintiffs' attorneys can minimize the
effects of opponents' tactics to escalate costs (through discovery requests, motion
practice, and trial strategy), plaintiffs' attorneys may be in a better position to
inflict high litigation costs on the defendant without fear of retaliation. 6 Of
course, a large corporate defendant, with abundant resources, may be able to
handle such escalatory tactics. It may even be willing and able to escalate legal
costs with its own tactics, for example, by attempting to run a solo practitioner
ragged. But, from the perspective of deterrence, this defendant will end up
devoting significant resources to such cases-perhaps more than if it had settled
at the outset. 0 7 Either way, then, defendants' expected litigation costs lead to
higher total payments by defendants.
Given that contingent-fee arrangements may improve a party's bargaining
power not only by countering his risk aversion, but also by constraining litigation
expense, it is somewhat surprising that more defendants do not pay their attorneys
a contingent fee. This additional advantage of contingent-fee arrangements
logically should lead defendants to be willing to pay contingent fees, even if such
fees include a premium to compensate attorneys for bearing some of the risk of
loss.
The relative scarcity of contingent-fee arrangements among defendants may be
attributed not only to different risk preferences, but also to practical obstacles.
Contingent-fee arrangements for plaintiffs are more straightforward than for
defendants. The attorney typically receives one-third of the plaintiff's recovery

187-90 (1993) (discussing Patricia Munch Danzon, Contingent Fees for PersonalInjury
Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON. 213 (1983); Kritzer et al., supra note 58; Schwartz & Mitchell,
supranote 40). Conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients that agree to contingent-fee
arrangements are addressed below. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
105. See supranote 58 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence C.Marshall et al., The
Use andImpact ofRule 11, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 943, 964 (1992) ("'most lawyers will prefer to
leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, they can charge by the stone') (quoting Deborah
L. Rhode, EthicalPerspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 635 (1985)).
106. See supra Part II.B (discussing incentive to impose high litigation costs on one's
opponent in order to improve one's own settlement prospects).
107. Then again, to the extent that escalation delays any payment by the defendant, the
defendant may save the time value of money. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Mediation with a
Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Services and the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in
Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1808, 1823 (1986) (advocating inclusion of prejudgment
interest in money judgments).
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(often after the attorney's out-of-pocket expenses are deducted), and if a
particular client's case is too small for a high profile attorney, that attorney
ordinarily will refer the client to an attorney who is willing to earn less, rather
than negotiate with the client for a higher percentage of the recovery.
Accordingly, lawyers and clients may be matched without having to agree in
advance on the case's precise value.
In contrast, contingent-fee arrangements for defendants are substantially more
complicated. The defendant and its attorney may agree that the attorney will
receive nothing if the plaintiff wins a verdict greater than a certain amount, or a
percentage (say one-third) of any savings if the client ultimately pays the plaintiff
less than the set amount. Or, perhaps they could agree upon hourly rates that
would vary with the measure of success. In any event, unlike the plaintiff, the
defendant must agree with his attorney on the case's worth-that is, how success
or failure is defined with respect to a case-before it can agree on the terms of a
contingent-fee arrangement.
3. Conflicts of Interest Between Attorney and Client
The above discussions-of how contingent-fee arrangements improve
plaintiffs' bargaining power and decrease their litigation expenses-treat the
attorney and client as a team. However, attorneys and clients who agree to
contingent-fee arrangements do not always operate as a unified team. By their
nature, contingent-fee arrangements shift the cost of not settling (and proceeding
to trial) from the client to his attorney. 8 Contingent-fee arrangements may thus
provide the client and the attorney with different incentives.
Putting aside for now the attractiveness of having a sum certain in hand, a
plaintiff freed of hourly legal bills has no financial incentive to settle for an
amount less than the expected verdict."° This is so regardless of how much time
and effort it will take to litigate the case."' The plaintiff s attorney, by contrast,
will be inclined to accept a settlement offer that is lower than the expected verdict
because of the saved time and effort (i.e., the opportunity cost)." Indeed,
because the plaintiff's attorney will receive only one-third of the ultimate verdict
but will bear the entire cost of proceeding with the case, he will be inclined to
settle for less than a contingent-fee plaintiff, and perhaps even less than a plaintiff
paying hourly legal fees. The client paying hourly bills would be willing to accept
a settlement that is lower than his expected verdict, so long as his saved legal fees

108. See, e.g., DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT 109-12 (1974); Miller, supra
note 45, at 199; Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 40, at 1126; see also Bruce L. Hay,
ContingentFeesandAgency Costs,25 J. LEGAL STuD. 503, 513-14 (1996) (focusing on lawyer

effort generally, rather than on settlement dynamics).
109. A client's risk aversion, however, might lead him to accept a lower settlement early in
a case in order to eliminate the possibility of losing or receiving a low verdict.
110. See Miller, supra note 45, at 199. This analysis ignores litigation expenses other than
the opportunity cost of the lawyer's time, which may, depending upon the nature of the
contingent-fee agreement, be paid out of the verdict or settlement before the attorney's onethird share is calculated. See supra note 93.
111. See Miller, supra note 45, at 200-02; Smith, supra note 76, at 2173.
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exceed the difference; the contingency lawyer would want to accept a difference
three times as great in order to avoid the costs of proceeding (because he receives
only one-third of any gain).
In theory, this difference in incentives could have a dramatic effect on
settlement negotiations with defendants. When faced with the choice of whether
to settle, a plaintiffs attorney would be inclined to proceed only if additional
litigation were likely to increase the settlement (or verdict) by three times the
opportunity cost of that additional litigation. A defendant, by contrast, would be
inclined to proceed so long as additional litigation would reduce the settlement
payment by more than the additional legal bills. Thus, if each hour of plaintiffs'
and defendants' attorneys' time were of equal value (and both sides were equally
optimistic about the benefits of proceeding), plaintiffs' attorneys would be more
eager to settle than defendants. Moreover, this would be true even if plaintiffs'
attorneys were able to devote on average half as much time as defendants'
attorneys to the same litigation task, as empirical research reveals to be the
case." 2 For example, if additional litigation would cost the plaintiff s attorney
$100, he would be inclined not to proceed unless he expected his effort to
increase the settlement by more than $300. In contrast, assuming the defendant's
costs of proceeding were twice as expensive, the defendant would proceed with
litigation so long as the additional litigation would reduce the settlement payment
by more than $200. Accordingly, the plaintiff's attorney would generally be more
willing to settle than the defendant.
In practice, however, this hypothetical choice-between settling or conducting
a particular litigation task-is not a real one. First, while contingent-fee
plaintiffs' attorneys may spend half as much time as defendants' attorneys on the
particular task of responding to opponents' motions, plaintiffs' attorneys tasks
may be qualitativelydifferent. For instance, the subject matter of many tort suits
inherently leads to more extensive discovery requests by plaintiffs, and greater
expense to defendants." 3 Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys may save additional time
by postponing tasks; they can reject pending settlement offers as too low and
simply let case files sit on their shelves in the expectation of a future offer." 4
Defendants with tight control over case management might benefit from the same
strategy; indeed, unless they are later saddled with a verdict that includes
prejudgment interest, defendants can earn a return during the delay on any funds
they have set aside for the case."' But, if the defendants' hourly-fee attorneys do

112. See Kritzer et al., supranote 58, at 271.
113. See Sofaer, supra note 67, at 723 (noting that "[djiscovery is... made costly" because
"plaintiffs [may] file complaints in which they need do little more than allege an injury that is
believed to have resulted from some dangerous instrumentality or activity, and this will
generally entitle them to search for an explanation through discovery"); cf Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study ofSettlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN.
L. REv. 497, 548-49 (1991) (noting that securities litigation is more expensive for defendants
than plaintiffs, in part because discovery is virtually one-sided).
114. See Brazil, supra note 67, at 226 (discussing delays in discovery scheduling).
115. See Alschuler, supra note 107, at 1823.
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not receive strict instructions to the contrary, they are likely to continue working
on the case while it is pending." 6
In addition, the above comparison between the costs of proceeding to
defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys assumed that each lawyer's time was equally
valuable. It is unclear, in practice, however, whether the opportunity cost to the
plaintiff's attorney of spending an additional hour on a case will have the same
value as the actual dollar amount paid by the defendant for the same hour of
work. The financial loss to the plaintiff s attorney can equal the hourly fee paid
by the defendant only if the plaintiffs attorney has clients waiting to pay a
comparable hourly fee, or else an abundance of contingent-fee cases that are just
as profitable. Outside the culture of billable hours, it is unclear whether an
additional hour worked translates into a concrete expenditure of wealth.
Furthermore, even putting aside these factors, and assuming that plaintiffs'
attorneys are more eager to settle than defendants, those attorneys are bound by
an ethical obligation to follow their clients' wishes as to settlement."' Just as
hourly-fee attorneys cannot ethically advise their clients to proceed to trial simply
to increase the lawyer's billable time, contingent-fee attorneys cannot ethically
advise their clients to settle for an amount that benefits the attorney, but not the
client. This is not to say that the attorney's ethical obligation requires him to
ignore his own interests completely. Rather, a contingent-fee attorney can serve
his clients well simply by considering the collective interests of attorney and
client together. As noted above, if the attorney considers the interests of the
attorney-client team, the availability of contingent-fee arrangements will increase
settlement amounts markedly by improving plaintiffs' bargaining power and
decreasing their litigation expenses.
Granted, it is dangerous to rely upon an ethical obligation to overcome
financial self-interest." 8 But, as an empirical matter attorneys often do proceed

116. See Marshall et al., supranote 105, at 963-64 (citing Rhode, supra note 105, at 635);
Coffee, supranote 100, at 247 (noting defense attorneys' incentive to maximize hours).
117. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.5 cmt 3 (1995) ("An agreement
may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the
client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest."); id. Rule 1.7 cmt. 6 ("The
lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of
a client."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILrrY EC 5-7 (1980) ("The possibility
of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client
during litigation generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest
in the cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the
litigation."); id. ("[A] lawyer, because he is in a better position to evaluate a cause of action,
should enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement
will be beneficial to the client."); ROSENTHAL, supra note 108, at 110 ("In a few instances,
cooling out the client is a breach of legal ethics.").
118. Compare this with Clermont & Currivan, supra note 93, who state that:
[W]e propose that the lawyer and the client are rational, economic beings who
tend to act in accordance with their own direct economic best interests. Morality,
professional ethics, or even self-interested concern for indirect benefits such as
a good reputation might, of course, cause the lawyer or the client to act in a
contrary way. Or, one party to the lawyer-client relationship might have sufficient
power to force the other to act contrary to the latter's direct economic best
interests. For example, an occasional, sophisticated client might be able to control
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to trial on their clients' instructions in cases that the attorneys would prefer to
settle. " 9 Moreover, in these cases business considerations may reinforce ethical
obligations, as attorneys seek to maintain a reputation of fulfilling their clients'
wishes. 2 ' In still other cases, plaintiffs' attorneys actually benefit from their
clients' desire to hold out for higher settlements.' These attorneys may rely on
their clients' wishes in settlement negotiations to reject reasonable settlement
offers in the hope of receiving still better offers. Thus,
[c]ontingent-fee contracts give plaintiffs a strategic bargaining
advantage.... The personal injury plaintiff's attorney can credibly
claim that her client will insist on a trial, regardless of the costs, unless
she is given some cash in settlement. The defense attorney in most
types of personal injury litigation cannot make a parallel claim."
Finally, where the client and attorney fear that they may have deeply conflicting
interests, the two can, and often do, agree upon a fee arrangement that provides
for a higher fee (e.g., 40% instead of 33%) if the case proceeds to trial.' Such

the lawyer so that he serves the client's interest more perfectly. Nevertheless, we
focus on direct economic interests because our aim is to see how the unrestrained
economic animal will act, and then to change the economic environment so that
the same animal would be inclined to act in a socially more desirable manner.
With such change, society could lessen its reliance on those noneconomic or
indirect restraints currently used to bring about socially desirable behavior.
Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
119. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 88, at 355 (noting that in a large subset of cases
studied, where trials produced recoveries only slightly larger than settlement offers, "the
attorneys would predictably have done better to settle, and knew it, but their clients reasonably
preferred to go to court"); see also Gross & Syverud, supra note 100, at 42 (confirming after
studying additional trial data that plaintiffs who proceed to trial generally would have done
better by settling).
120. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 93, at 534.
121. See Gross & Syverud, supranote 88, at 350-51.
122. Id. at 360.
123. See id at 349 n.71; cf ROSENTHAL, supranote 108, at 112 (stating that one "option for
resolving the conflict between the lawyer's and client's interests is to bring the specific conflict
issues up for discussion"); Bruce L. Hay, Optimal ContingentFees in a World ofSettlement,

26 J. LEGAL STuD. 259 (1997) (advocating a fee structure in which attorneys receive a larger
portion of a recovery in the event of a trial). In theory, rather than simply using the pretrial
conference as a dividing line, the fee arrangement could be scaled to reflect the attorney's
added effort throughout the course of the litigation. In practice, however, it might be difficult
both to agree upon these terms in advance, and to monitor when the attorney has exceeded a
certain level of effort and therefore is entitled to a higher fee. Such an arrangement might result
in the same costly ex ante and ex post negotiations over fees in which hourly attorneys and
their clients often engage. In addition,
even if a graduated fee scale were so precise as to give the attorney the same return
from settlement at any point in the lawsuit, there is no guarantee that the
settlement figure that the attorney would accept would give the client a return
equal to the client's return from trial.
Miller, supra note 45, at 201-02.
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arrangements encourage the attorney to proceed to trial, instead of convincing his
client to accept a low settlement.
4. Summary
The availability of contingent-fee arrangements thus not only increases the rate
at which plaintiffs file lawsuits, but also increases settlement amounts by
improving the bargaining power of plaintiffs and enabling them to handle
unreasonably high litigation costs better than defendants. True, some lawsuits
may result in settlements that are no higher, or perhaps lower, than would result
if plaintiffs could afford to hire hourly attorneys, because some contingent-fee
attorneys may convince some clients to settle based on the attorney's, rather than
the client's, or their collective, interests. But, given that many plaintiffs can sue
only because of contingent-fee arrangements, and that the remaining plaintiffs
who would have sued anyway (even if contingent fees were not permitted) are
still free to hire hourly attorneys, a rule that allows contingent fees substantially
benefits plaintiffs and increases the amount that potential defendants pay for
lawsuits. Moreover, because sliding-scale fee arrangements help alleviate
conflicts of interest between attorney and client, and because the plaintiffs'
interests often prevail where conflicts do arise, contingent-fee arrangements, on
balance, ensure that the negotiating positions of plaintiffs are comparable to those
of defendants.
In short, the availability of contingent-fee arrangements prevents potential
defendants from expecting to capture the lion's share of bargaining surplus in
each case and, consequently, from expecting to pay settlements that do not cover
the value of their victims' injuries. By ensuring that defendants generally expect
to pay fair settlements for meritorious tort claims, contingent-fee arrangements
protect against underdeterrence.' 24

124. Thus, while Polinsky and Rubenfeld hypothesize that settlements may result in
underdeterrence because plaintiffs forego some meritorious claims and defendants pay less than
their victims' injuries, for others these assumptions do not hold true. See supra note 84. Gross
and Syverud offer another reason why defendants may be willing to pay more than plaintiffs
ask in settlement negotiations. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 100, at 37-38. Because a large
portion of total tort awards is awarded in a handful of cases, while half of tried cases result in
zero recoveries for the plaintiff, the difference between mean and median jury awards can be
quite large. See id."For a plaintiff," they explain, "a mean so heavily influenced by rare large
verdicts is an inflated estimate of the value of a claim." Id. at 37. Yet, for a repeat defendant,
"the mean expected judgment is an excellent estimate of the cost of a case." Id. at 38.
Accordingly,
[i]f the risk.., to the [repeat] defendant is measured by the mean judgment for
similar cases, but the value to the [one-shot] plaintiff is much lower-in the range
between the median and the median of nonzero awards-then there is a large
range of possible settlements between what the plaintiff expects to get and what
the defendant fears losing.
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C. Defendants' PresettlementLitigation Expenses
In addition to paying settlements to plaintiffs, however, defendants must pay
presettlement legal fees. As background, recall that if two parties were to agree
on a case's factual and legal merits before engaging in discovery or motion
practice, they could avoid much of litigation's cost simply by settling the case for
its agreed-upon value. 2 ' Recall, also, that if such scenarios were common in
practice, the filing and settlement of meritorious lawsuits would provide
defendants with efficient deterrence incentives. It would not matter that our rules
governing discovery and fee shifting result in unreasonably high litigation costs,
beyond one's own control, that must be borne regardless of the merits.
Defendants would expect to avoid these litigation costs simply by settling early,
and thus expect to pay amounts for the injuries they inflict that are closely tied to
the merits.
It was also demonstrated earlier, however, that plaintiffs and defendants cannot
avoid the high costs of litigation simply by settling. 2 ' At the outset of a
case-before the parties have undertaken discovery or filed any motions-the
parties are likely to disagree about the value of a case. Parties are likely to handle
their disagreement over the merits either (1) by engaging in some discovery and
motion practice before settling, or (2) by settling for an amount that does not
accurately reflect the merits of a case, but rather depends upon the parties'
27
relative litigation costs and bargaining strengths.
Consider the latter category of cases first-that is, cases in which parties
negotiate settlements, before any discovery or motion practice, based as much
upon the parties' relative litigation costs and bargaining strengths as upon their
views of the merits. A large portion of these cases may be weak or meritless.
Another portion may be strong cases that are settled for much less than their
merits warrant. In any given case, then, the resulting random settlement amount
is likely to be too high or too low.
On average, however, these errors might offset one another and defendants
might ultimately pay amounts that reflect the suits' aggregate merits. Indeed, this
is likely given that tort defendants generally approach litigation with superior
bargaining power, but contingent-fee arrangements alleviate the disparity by
managing plaintiffs' litigation risk and enabling plaintiff-attorney teams to handle
escalated litigation costs better than defendants. 2 Under such conditions, early
settlements are likely, on average, to be accurate, as plaintiffs would settle
meritorious cases for too little just as often as defendants would settle weak, or
meritless, cases for too much. The resulting problem with deterrence would not
be that defendants would consistently expect to pay too much or too little for
lawsuits, but rather that they would pay amounts bearing little relation to the
merits. Indeed, a defendant might prefer such random, but on average equitable,

125. See supra Part II.B.
126. See supra Part II.B.
127. See supra Part II.B.
128. See supra Part III.B.
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settlements over paying fair settlement amounts plus litigation expenses. If so, the
defendant might seek to settle every case early in order to avoid paying
consistently too much.
In reality, however, a defendant could not hope to lower its tort-related
payments with this strategy, for as soon as plaintiffs' attorneys were to learn of
the defendant's willingness to settle early, the strategy would lead to an increase
in weak and meritless filings.'29 The defendant might save litigation expenses in
some cases, but it would end up paying more to settle weak and meritless cases
than if it had decided to engage in some discovery and motion practice. Thus,
although there may be a subset of cases in which defendants and plaintiffs agree
to settle early, despite wide disagreement, in order to avoid the costs of discovery
and motion practice, defendants cannot ensure this outcome in any particular
case, let alone in most cases. A defendant may reduce its presettlement litigation
expense by settling early or it may reduce the settlements it pays for meritless
cases by refusing to settle, but it generally cannot do both.
Now return to the first category of cases, those in which the parties settle after
engaging in some discovery. In these cases, defendants will pay both
presettlement discovery expenses (to their attorneys) and settlements (to
plaintiffs). Moreover, as Part II demonstrated, because the rules governing
discovery and motion practice provide neither proper incentives nor external
control over the parties' tactics, the defendant's presettlement litigation
expenditures are likely to be unreasonably high. 3 Indeed, the costs incurred prior
to settlement-in pleadings, discovery and motion practice, as well as in
negotiations-will often exceed the costs of trial preparation and trial that would
be incurred if the parties failed to settle.' Thus, to the extent that parties wait to
settle until the eve of trial, they will already have borne the bulk of possible
litigation expenses.'
In short, when contingent-fee arrangements are considered together with liberal
discovery rules and a refusal to shift fees, it becomes clear that defendants
generally cannot expect to dispose of meritorious tort claims without paying both
fair settlements to plaintiffs and significant presettlement fees to their lawyers.

129. Cf Robert G. Bone, Modeling FrivolousSuits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 552 (1997)
("Defendants want plaintiffs to know the truth when their suit is meritless, but not when their
suit is meritorious.").
130. See supra Part II.B. Of course, included within these costs are the costs of settlement
negotiations themselves-that is, the time it takes defense lawyers to negotiate settlements. See
Galanter, supra, note I, at 28.
131. See Trubek et al., supranote 5, at 90, 104 (noting that trial on average will add less than
10% to the time an attorney devotes to a case); supranote 71. But cf Gross & Syverud, supra
note 100, at 33 (noting that the average personal injury trial lasts eight days).
132. To the extent that litigation is not only expensive, but also prolonged, defendants' legal
fees may be offset partially by the time value of money. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 107,
at 1823.
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D. Contingent-FeeArrangementsand Meritless Lawsuits
Defendants also must incur some expense to dispose of meritless lawsuits.
Indeed, the United States' decision to allow contingent-fee arrangements but not
fee shifting tends to increase the number of meritless, as well as meritorious,
filings. Recall that plaintiffs have an incentive to file lawsuits whenever an
attorney is willing to represent them for a contingent fee. Moreover, as noted
earlier with respect to small meritorious lawsuits, a plaintiffs' attorney may hope
to profit from a case, even if the expected verdict will not cover his total litigation
expenses, so long as he can induce the defendant to settle before trial for an
amount that will cover three times the attorney's effort up to that point.
One might expect that where a case is meritless, and the anticipated recovery
is zero (or close to zero), the plaintiff's attorney will have difficulty presenting
a credible threat of continued litigation at each stage. Simply consider the
attorney's position on the eve of trial if no settlement has been reached: with an
expected recovery of zero, the attorney would be inclined to drop the case no
matter how little it would cost to try it.
Nevertheless, there are several explanations for why plaintiffs' attorneys may
hope to profit from meritless lawsuits. 3 a Some of these explanations would apply
as well to plaintiffs who pay hourly fees. On balance, however, contingent-fee
arrangements (together with non-fee-shifting) tend to increase meritless filings.
1. Information Asymmetries
First, a plaintiffs' attorney may credibly threaten to litigate a meritless lawsuit
where information asymmetries are present.' A plaintiffs' attorney may hope to
settle a case that he knows to be meritless if he, alone, has seen its flaws and if he
hopes that discovery will fail to reveal its weaknesses before the defendant agrees

133. Avery Katz's and Lucian Bebchuk's models help to explain plaintiffs' incentives to file
and defendants' incentives to settle suits that only plaintiffs know to be meritless. See
Bebchuck, supra note 94, at 439 (noting that the success of "negative-economic value" suits
may be explained "by defendant uncertainty as to whether or not the suit is an NEV one");
Avery Katz, The Effect ofFrivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement ofLitigation, 10 INT'L REV.
L. &ECON. 3, 4 (1990) ("The main reason that frivolous suits are not always met with a blanket
denial and refusal to negotiate, of course, is that the defendant rarely knows the merits of the
claim with certainty."). Robert Bone has discussed Katz's model of "informed-plaintiff"
information asymmetries and has modeled as well asymmetries in which defendants are aware
of a suit's flaws but plaintiffs are uninformed. See Bone, supra note 129, at 524 ("Frivolous
litigation is most likely to occur under conditions of asymmetric information."). David
Rosenberg and Steven Shavell have modeled "nuisance value" suits that both parties view to
be meritless, but which may nonetheless profit plaintiffs because the timing and extent of
litigation effort favors them. See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits
are Broughtfor Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
134. See Bebchuk, supra note 94, at 439; Katz, supra note 133, at 4.
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to settle.'" This risk-laden strategy, which requires a basic understanding of
discovery practices (and an ability to predict the point in the litigation process
when the defendant is likely to learn a relevant fact), is less likely to work for
plaintiffs who pay their attorneys an hourly fee than for plaintiffs and attorneys
who agree to a contingent-fee arrangement. Plaintiffs' attorneys are better able
than their clients to predict, and to exploit, their opponents' mistakes.
A different sort of information asymmetry-in which the plaintiff rather than
the defendant is mistaken-may enable plaintiffs credibly to threaten continued
litigation, whether they pay hourly or contingent fees. 36 For example, a plaintiff
and his attorney might choose to file, and litigate, an ultimately meritless lawsuit
if they believe that the case has merit or that discovery will reveal previously
unknown strengths. Even if the defendant knows he ultimately would win at trial,
he nevertheless may be willing to settle early in order to avoid the costs of
litigation-that is, the cost of educating his opponent or the court about the true
nature of the case. Alternatively (and perhaps more likely), the informed
defendant will defend these meritless claims and incur significant expenses in the
37
process.1

135. See Brazil, supra note 67, at 225 (noting that because discovery is so expensive,
attorneys often advise clients to forego discovery and settle, even where they suspect that
opponents may be hiding information). If defendants fear that settling when they are
uninformed will invite more meritless suits and ultimately cost them more than their saved
litigation costs, then defendants will refuse to settle and meritless filings will cause harm not
by transferring wealth unjustly from defendants to plaintiffs, but rather principally because of
the extra litigation costs defendants will incur to defend both meritorious and meritless cases.
See Bebchuck, supra note 94, at 441; Bone, supra note 129, at 549. Only if defendants
consistently refused to settle where they are uninformed would plaintiffs be discouraged from
knowingly filing meritless cases in the first place. However, Katz has demonstrated that the
greater the defendants' litigation costs, the more likely it is that plaintiffs will file meritless
suits (because defendants will be willing to settle a greater percentage of them). See Katz, supra
note 133, at 14. The unreasonably high costs of litigation outlined in Part II, and plaintiffs'
power to inflict litigation costs on defendants through discovery, thus support the intuition that
plaintiffs sometimes knowingly file and profit from meritless cases.
136. Indeed, the scholarship cited in the preceding and succeeding footnotes discusses the
relevant issues from the perspective of plaintiffs who pay hourly fees, rather than that of
plaintiffs' attorneys deciding whether to work for a contingent fee.
137. Robert Bone analyzes an uninformed plaintiff's decision either to investigate a claim
before filing or else to file a potentially meritless claim and bear the risk of litigating a case that
might lose. See Bone, supra note 129, at 559-63. He identifies three different equilibria: (1)
an "investigation equilibrium" inwhich plaintiffs always investigate because investigation costs
are low relative to discovery costs; (2) a "filing equilibrium" in which plaintiffs always file
without investigating because investigation costs are high relative to discovery costs; or (3) a
"mixed equilibrium" in which plaintiffs investigate sometimes and file sometimes, based on
more closely aligned investigation and discovery costs. See id. Under the filing and mixed
equilibria, Bone explains, defendants incur greater litigation costs than they would if plaintiffs
were to investigate before filing, because defendants have to incur expense defending some
meritless cases (although under the mixed equilibrium defendants may recoup some of that
expense by inducing uninformed plaintiffs to drop some meritorious cases). See id. Because
of the discovery and non-fee-shifting rules outlined in Part II, cases at the "investigation
equilibrium" may be much fewer than Bone envisions and cases at the socially costly "filing
equilibrium" much more numerous. Bone fails to take into account that even where prefiling
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In theory, plaintiffs' attorneys who work for contingent fees should be warier
of misjudging a case's worth than hourly attorneys, as contingency attorneys bear
the opportunity cost of litigating losing cases.' In contrast, clients who pay
hourly fees should have greater incentives to avoid mistakes than contingency
clients, for hourly-fee arrangements require the client to bear the costs of
unsuccessful litigation. Because attorneys should be better able than their clients
to judge the value of a case, and contingent-fee arrangements give the atorney,
rather than client, an incentive to avoid inaccurate predictions of the verdict, one
would expect fewer meritless filings under contingent-fee arrangements.
In practice, however, most contingent-fee plaintiffs' attorneys earn their living
by filing more suits than they have time to investigate.' 39 Ultimately, contingentfee arrangements may lead to less thorough prefiling investigation than an hourlyfee structure.
2. Timing and Extent of Litigation Effort
Indeed, a contingent-fee structure may induce plaintiffs to file even those suits
that both sides consider weak or meritless from the outset. As noted above,
contingent-fee plaintiffs' attorneys file many cheap, "cookie-cutter" complaints
that take little time to prepare, thus placing the onus upon the defendant either to
settle the case quickly or else to pay a lawyer to prepare an answer (and/or a
motion to dismiss) that reveals the claim's flaws. 4 ' Even if a defendant expects
that the plaintiff eventually will drop the case (or allow it to linger on the docket
without further action), the defendant nonetheless may offer a nuisance settlement
in some cases to avoid the costs of responding.' 4' The key to success for the
plaintiffs' attorney in these meritless cases is ensuring that the defendant is the
first party to face significant costs-so that the defendant will have an incentive
to settle even if he knows the plaintiff later will drop the case, and so that the
plaintiff can indeed drop the case with only minor losses if the defendant refuses
to settle.' 42 Another crucial point is that the plaintiffs' attorney must avoid

investigation costs are quite small (and plaintiffs expect defendants to refuse to settle meritless
claims), plaintiffs might still file claims without any investigation in order to shift investigation
costs (via discovery) to defendants. In a system of litigation in which the opponent bears the
costs of investigation once a complaint is filed, it may be cheaper for plaintiffs to file than to
investigate. See Alexander, supra note 113, at 548-49 (discussing plaintiffs' ability to take
advantage of one-sided discovery); Sofaer, supra note 67, at 723 (same).
138. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 93, at 571-72; Rowe, Predicting the Effects,
supra note 76, at 152.
139. See Brazil, supra note 67, at 226.
140. Plaintiffs who pay their attorneys an hourly fee have neither the close control over their
own expenditures, nor the multitude of available lawsuits, to make this strategy profitable.
141. Rosenberg and Shavell's article provides an economic analysis of why plaintiffs may
file suits that both sides know to be meritless from the outset. See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra
note 133, at 3.
142. In his attempt to avoid devoting too many resources to these cases at the outset, the
plaintiffs' attorney would have to be careful not to file suits that are so patently frivolous as to
invite sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state law equivalent. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 11; cf infra Part V (discussing modifications of the Rule 11 standard that could
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targeting the same defendant too often: as noted earlier, defendants will fear
inviting more suits if they develop a reputation for paying nuisance settlements.'43
A weak or meritless case may also be profitable for a plaintiffs' attorney even
if the initial complaint takes some time to prepare, so long as he is confident that
future litigation will hurt the defendant more than it will hurt the plaintiffs'
attorney. Empirical research suggests that a strategy of inflicting costs to induce
settlement may be feasible for contingent-fee plaintiffs' attorneys, because, as
noted above, they spend, on average, only half as much time responding to their
opponents' motions as hourly defense attorneys do.'" Moreover, certain types of
cases may lend themselves to lopsided discovery, enabling the plaintiff to inflict
even larger costs on the defendant. 45 Although large corporate defendants might
seem better equipped to bear expensive litigation than small firms of plaintiffs'
attorneys (and clearly are better equipped than individual plaintiffs who pay
hourly fees), these defendants nonetheless may be induced to settle either because
they retain less control over their own litigation expenses than do contingent-fee
plaintiffs' attorneys, or because they wish to avoid disproportional discovery.
3. The Client's Wishes
There is one additional-and important-reason why the availability of
contingent-fee arrangements may increase the amounts that defendants are
induced to pay in order to dispose of meritless cases. Consider a meritless lawsuit
in which a plaintiffs' attorney has pursued one of the strategies described above:
he hoped at the outset that the defendant would settle before learning of the case's
weaknesses, that discovery would reveal strengths, that the defendant would settle
before the plaintiffs' attorney devoted any resources, or that the defendant would
settle simply to avoid expensive litigation. Further imagine that the strategy has
failed. The defendant has refused to settle and both attorneys now agree that the
plaintiff will lose if they go to trial.
The plaintiffs' attorney working for a contingent fee nonetheless may credibly
threaten continued litigation if his client wishes to continue. Unlike the plaintiff
who pays an hourly fee, a contingent-fee attorney may not be able to drop a case
simply because it has become unprofitable. If the attorney cannot convince his
client to drop the case, he is obligated to continue-even if it means losing money
(or bearing the opportunity cost of proceeding).' 46
To summarize, when the availability of contingent-fee arrangements is
considered together with discovery and non-fee-shifting rules, the total amount
that defendants pay to defend and settle lawsuits generally exceeds what they
would pay under substantive law alone. This is true because defendants' total tort
payments cover not only their victims' injuries (as substantive law would

discourage meritless filings).
143. See supraPart III.C.
144. See Kritzer et al., supra note 58, at 271; supra Part III.B.2.
145. See Alexander, supranote 113, at 548-49; Sofaer, supra note 67, at 723.
146. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 88, at 350-51 (noting that obligation may stem from
ethics rules or simply from a wish to preserve the attorney's reputation among potential
clients).
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require), but also the unreasonably high costs of litigation outlined in Part II and
the significant costs of defending and/or settling meritless cases as well.
IV. SKEWED DETERRENCE AND COMPENSATION

The tort theory discussed in Part I assumes that people (both corporations and
individuals) structure their behavior to minimize their potential liability under the
governing substantive law. 47 Under a negligence regime, they take only
reasonable risks, so that they will not be held liable for any resulting injuries.
Under a strict liability regime, they structure their activities so as to ensure that
anticipated profits exceed anticipated damages from any resulting injuries.
According to both negligence and strict liability advocates, then, tort law's
deterrent effect results from potential liability under the relevant substantive law.
Parts II and III demonstrated, however, that in practice defendants ordinarily
do not pay for the injuries they inflict simply according to relevant substantive
law. Rather, plaintiffs decide to sue, and parties reach settlements, based upon the
anticipated expense of litigation as well as upon the merits of the given case. A
company that wishes to pursue a business endeavor, then, will consider not simply
the likelihood that the endeavor will cause injury for which it will be liable, but
also the ancillary costs of litigation. While these two considerations are related,
the discussion thus far has demonstrated that they are not identical. Parts II and
III explored how procedural rules-regarding discovery, fee shifting, and
contingent-fee arrangemets-can alter the amount that potential defendants
expect to pay for their conduct. Those Parts explained that these procedural rules,
when combined, aggravate the divergence between the merits of cases and the
amounts defendants expect to pay for them, leading defendants to expect to pay
more than the merits warrant for meritorious cases and significant amounts even
for meritless cases. The discussion that follows addresses the resulting impact of
these procedural rules on tort law's dual goals of deterrence and compensation.
A. PredictabilityandDeterrence
The extent to which procedural rules skew a substantive rule's deterrent effect
depends upon whether they influence litigation and settlement dynamics in a
predictable manner. Deterrence, after all, is achieved only to the extent that actors
can anticipate ex ante the legal consequences of their actions.' 48 A procedural rule
thus can affect tort law deterrence only if it applies with predictability and leads
149
to a foreseeable result.

147. See supraPartI.
148. See Kaplow, supra note 33, at 309 (noting that "greater accuracy [in adjudication] is
valuable only to the extent it involves dimensions about which individuals are informed at the
time they act").
149. Of course an actor may alter his actions based upon the fear that a certain rule will
apply even if he does not know for sure that it will apply. The text does not equate
foreseeability with certainty. For an in-depth analysis of the effects of uncertainty on deterrence
incentives, see generally Calfee & Craswell, supra note 4. See also Grady, supra note 33, at
806 (criticizing conventional negligence theory's "assumption that injurers can always identify
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Each of the rules described above as affecting litigation costs is applied almost
uniformly throughout the United States. Accordingly, individuals and companies
doing business in the United States know that if they are sued for conduct here,
the resulting lawsuits will be litigated in a system that allows liberal discovery
and contingent fees, but does not shift legal fees from the winner to the loser.' °
Moreover, the general effect of these rules on litigation expenses and settlement
values is sufficiently predictable to influence deterrence. As discussed in Parts
II and III, the rules regarding discovery, fee shifting, and contingent-fee
arrangements lead potential defendants to expect to pay not only for the injuries
of tort victims-as substantive law would require-but also for presettlement
litigation expenses in meritorious cases, as well as the significant amounts needed
to dispose of meritless claims.
The following sections explore how the prospect of paying anything for
meritless cases and paying high ancillary costs for meritorious cases leads to
overdeterrence in both negligence and strict liability regimes.
B. Settlement Without Regard to Causation
Corporations and individuals may, in theory, pursue a course of conduct
without fear of liability so long as they are confident that their actions will not
actually cause an injury, because neither a negligence regime nor a strict liability
regime will impose liability absent proof of causation. In practice,however, the
dynamics of litigation and settlement described above may lead a corporation to
expect to incur some expense even for injuries that it does not cause.
Consider a drug manufacturer that wishes to market a new form of oral
contraceptive. If it discovers side effects, then the company will choose not to
market the drug if its exposure to liability exceeds its anticipated profits.'' No
matter how thorough its tests, however, the company faces the possibilitythat
some of its customers will suffer medical ailments that they believe to be caused
by the contraceptive." 2 If some of these customers find attorneys willing to take
their cases for a contingent fee, then the costs of litigation will lead the company

with perfect certainty the precaution level that courts will determine to be" reasonable). For a
discussion of the effects of uncertainty on a plaintiff's decision to sue, see Bebchuk & Chang,
supra note 76, at 373 (discussing effects of different fee-shifting regimes where the "outcome
of trial is unlikely to be certain to the plaintiff when it decides whether to sue").
150. Alaska, however, has a modified version of the English fee-shifting rule. See ALASKA
R. Civ. P. 82 (setting forth schedule of fees that may be awarded to a successful plaintiff, but
leaving judge to decide on fees to be awarded to a successful defendant).
151. Or it may obey the law for other reasons, such as a sense of doing the right thing or
avoiding damage to its reputation.
152. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 16, 33 (1993) (noting the
difficulty we have with managing very small risks and the psychological desire to assign blame
to a definite cause). Unfortunately, not only these potential plaintiffs, but also juries, judges,
and society generally, may have difficulty weighing scientific evidence to determine what
actually caused these ailments.
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to expect to pay out settlements, or at least incur litigation expense, for lawsuits
based on injuries that are unrelated to its product.'
It is both inefficient and unfair to require defendants to bear any expense for
injuries they do not cause. True, the economic and moral justifications for strict
liability sensibly impose liability on the assumption that the defendant, rather than
the courts, is in the best position to determine whether there were reasonable
precautions that could have prevented an injury. 4 Moreover, the company that
tested, refined, and manufactured the product may also be in the best position to
determine as well whether any precautions-reasonable or unreasonable-could
have avoided the accident. But this does not mean that the producer should be
liable where proof of causation is absent.
The arguments in favor of strict liability do not apply where causation, rather
than fault, is in doubt. The economic and moral justifications for strict liability
all rest upon the premise that an activity's true costs should be internalized. If the
beneficiaries of an activity bear all of its actual costs, then they will (1) take
reasonable safety precautions, (2) weigh accident costs in deciding among
alternative activities, (3) effectively insure themselves against the costs of
mishaps by spreading those costs, and therefore (4) share in the moral
responsibility and accountability for the injuries to which they contribute.'55 In
contrast, imposing liability where causation is in doubt might force an activity to
bear external costs-that is, the costs of unrelated accidents. Imposing liability
for such external costs actually undermines the economic and moral justifications
for liability.
Most obviously, these external costs tend to overdeter reasonable activity by
favoring potentially less efficient alternative activities. If tort liability drives up
the price of a product, for example, corisumers will be inclined to purchase
substitutes. The imposition of external costs may also encourage excessive, inefficient safety precautions. Although actors cannot, by definition, do anything to
prevent injuries that are not caused by their conduct, they might nevertheless be
encouraged to adopt extra measures that appear to be safety related so as to
bolster a causation defense (if they anticipate having to prove that their conduct
could not possibly have caused a particular injury.) 56
Moreover, settlements paid without regard to causation impose mandatory
social insurance where it may be unnecessary and inefficient. Unlike traditional
insurance, Which spreads the costs of accidents according to broad categories of
risks (based on age and medical history, for example) the mandatory insurance
scheme imposed by strict liability has a very precise risk pool. Instead of all those

153. In addition, the company will take into account that other drug makers have been held
liable for medical ailments where the evidence of causation was quite weak. See PETER W.
HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE INTHE COURTROOM 1-2 (1991) (noting instances
in which legal causation has been found despite strong scientific evidence to the contrary).
154. See supra Part I.B.
155. See supra Part I.B.
156. Even if a company cannot disprove causation simply by pointing to its safety
precautions, its ability to point to these precautions may nevertheless improve its posture before
a jury and lessen the verdict against it, for example, by eliminating punitive damages. See
Calfee & Craswell, supranote 4, at 987.
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who hold medical insurance sharing the cost of an injury caused by a certain drug,
only those who use the drug will pay their share of the injuries it inflicts.'57 Strict
liability achieves economic efficiency by spreading the costs of an accident over
a more pertinent category of people than general insurance. But where causation
is in doubt, tort law's cost spreading does not add anything to general insurance,
which already spreads accident costs over a broad category of risk takers.'58
The moral arguments for imposing liability also break down where causation
is in doubt. Recall that the moral justification for imposing liability only upon
those who are negligent is that a person's decision to inflict a risk upon others
that he would accept for himself-that is, a reasonable risk-is not deemed
blameworthy.'59 Recall also the opposing moral argument (for strict liability):
rather than leave the costs of reasonable risks wherever they fall, it is more
equitable to shift them to the beneficiaries of those risks. 6 Without proof of
causation, however, the moral argument for liability collapses. Perhaps society
generally should help out the unfortunate few who suffer inexplicable injury, but
it is arbitrary and unfair to blame a limited number
of actors whose connection
6
to the injury is tenuous, and likely nonexistent.' '
C. Settlement Without Regard to Negligence
In a negligence regime, individuals are free, in theory, to act without fear of tort
liability so long as they take reasonable safety precautions. Take, for example, a
businessperson who wishes to open a minor league baseball stadium in his
hometown. If he is worried that spectators may be hit by foul balls, he can avoid
liability under a negligence rule by adopting reasonable safety precautions (e.g.,
a net behind home plate), which he may select based upon the rate of such
accidents in other stadiums and the effectiveness of precautions in those stadiums.
In theory, these reasonable precautions-that is, whose benefits outweigh their
burdens-would suffice to shield him from liability.' 62 Or consider a construction
company that contracts to repave sidewalks outside of office buildings, and is

157. See CALABRESI, supra note 6, at 50-54 (distinguishing two arguments in favor of
enterprise liability: (1) "plac[ing] losses on those categories of people who are most likely to
insure," and (2) "placing losses on those who are in a position to pass part of the loss on to
purchasers of their products or to factors employed in the production of their products").
158. Tort law does, however, provide more extensive compensation than private insurance.
If someone wanted more complete coverage, he or she could, in theory, purchase an insurance
policy that would cover such items as pain and suffering. However, such an option is not
typically available in practice. On the other shortcomings of private insurance as compared to
tort liability, see id. at 55-64.
159. See supra Part I.A.
160. See supra Part I.B.
161. When we are confronted with a calamity, our desire to understand the cause is strong.
See BREYER, supra note 152, at 16, 33. Nevertheless, it is unfair to lay blame prematurely,
without sufficient evidence, simply in order to satisfy this psychological need for definite
answers.
162. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 62, at 432-33 (noting that a general
negligence standard has replaced the traditional varying degrees of care owed to entrants upon
land).
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therefore afraid of "slip and fall" lawsuits by passing pedestrians. In theory, this
company too could avoid liability in a negligence regime, so long as it took
reasonable precautions-say, insuring that wet pavement areas were roped off,
that the areas were well marked, and that construction tools were locked away
each evening.
But, in reality, neither the businessperson nor the construction company could
reasonably expect to escape all litigation expense simply by complying with a
negligence standard. If each believes that someone will likely be injured at the
ball park or construction site, each also reasonably will expect to incur some
expense in defending and/or settling lawsuits, regardless of whether it is legally
at fault.'63
Thus, despite a substantive tort law regime that imposes liability only upon
proof of negligence, the potential defendants' analysis would resemble that
appropriate for a strict liability regime. They would not expect to avoid all
litigation costs simply by taking reasonable safety precautions. Rather, they
would expect to pay something for accidents-in the form of legal fees and/or
64
settlements-even where they have taken reasonable precautions.
Of course, substantive legal rules would affect the businesses' anticipated
accident-related expenses, and hence would affect deterrence. If they take
reasonable safety precautions, then they might expect to pay less to settle cases
in a negligence regime (where they would be more likely to win at trial) than in
a strict liability regime.' But, importantly, the substantive legal rule is only one
of the factors that the construction company, for example, would consider in
calculating the accident-cost component of its construction bids. Even in a
negligence regime, it would anticipate bearing some expense without regard to
fault.
Expecting to pay for nonnegligent conduct is not quite so grave as expecting
to pay for conduct without regard to causation. In some areas of tort law, after all,
our society chooses to impose liability,without regard to fault. Moreover, just like
a negligence regime, a strict liability regime seeks to deter unreasonable risks
(albeit by requiring the defendant to pay for all accidents and to sort out for
himself which precautions are reasonable)."6 Thus, the imposition of liability for
nonnegligent conduct should not alter a potential defendant's incentive to adopt
reasonable safety precautions.

163. Indeed, the construction company would factor anticipated litigation and settlement
costs (if it self-insures) or the liability insurance premiums that cover these costs (if it purchases
insurance) into its construction bids.
164. True, if defendants have difficulty distinguishing between meritless and meritorious
cases, this might lead defendants not only to offer too much for meritless cases, but also to offer
less for meritorious cases than it otherwise would--that is, to reduce settlement offers in those
cases where they truly were negligent. See Bebchuk, supra note 93, at 441. However, this
would not decrease the total amount that defendants ultimately have to pay, but rather would
simply increase the rate at which meritorious cases go to trial. See id.
165. See Viscusi, supra note 91, at 327-28.
166. See supra Part I.C (noting the similarities between negligence and strict liability
regimes).
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Nonetheless, a procedural system that imposes costs for reasonable conduct
despite a governing negligence standard is inefficient in two respects. First,
although such a regime may transform a negligence rule into a strict liability rule,
it fails to achieve one of the principal economic benefits of strict liability: tertiary
cost savings. In a strict liability regime, defendants (and plaintiffs and courts)
save the cost of litigating negligence. That cost is present, however, in a regime
that purports to apply a negligence standard, but in practice requires defendants
to pay some amount for nonnegligent conduct. The funds that defendants devote
to litigating fault in a negligence regime could serve the higher purpose in a strict
liability regime of compensating plaintiffs for their injuries. 67
Second, where the procedural regime transforms a negligence rule into a rule
of strict liability, the procedural regime will internalize accident costs where such
internalization may not be desirable. Recall that strict liability promotes safety
not only by encouraging reasonable safety precautions-a goal shared by
negligence and strict liability regimes-but also by internalizing the accident
costs of even nonnegligent conduct. Strict liability thereby encourages actors to
allocate resources to less risky endeavors. Indeed, the imposition of only
negligence liability for certain activities has been criticized because it tends to
insulate those activities from their true accident costs and thereby to favor them
over less risky alternatives. 68 Yet, society may decide to impose a negligence
standard precisely because it wants to subsidize a particular industry whose
public benefits exceed the profits its proprietors can hope to earn. Even if other
investments with comparable profits would entail lower accident costs, society
might choose to encourage investment in a particular industry by imposing only
negligence liability and allowing general medical insurance to bear remaining
accident costs. Such a goal cannot be achieved, however, in our procedural
system. By requiring the industry to bear accident costs even for nonnegligent
conduct, a procedural regime that transformed a negligence rule into one based
on strict liability would undermine the policy choice that underlies our
substantive law rule.
On balance, the first of these two problems-the cost of litigating fault-is
probably the more serious, as it is present in virtually every case. The second
problem-that of undermining society's decision to subsidize business-would
be present only in those instances where the substantive law negligence rule is
actually motivated by a desire to subsidize business. If society were indifferent
as between internalizing an industry's accident costs or allowing general medical
insurance to pay, then there would be less harm in having the procedural system
override substantive law and internalize the accident costs of nonnegligent
conduct.

167. Nor will a repeat defendant avoid the extra cost of litigating fault simply by ignoring
the negligence standard and paying settlements as if it were operating in a strict liability regime.
As discussed earlier, a defendant who adopts such a strategy of settling without regard to the
merits would invite plaintiffs to file more weak and meritless cases. See supra Part III.C.
168. See HORWITZ, supra note 27, at 97-101 (explaining how a negligence standard
historically has subsidized "those who undertook schemes of economic development").
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D. Tertiary Costs Become Primaryand Secondary Costs

The discussion thus far has pointed out the problems that occur when an actor
expects to pay for conduct regardless of the substantive law requirements of
causation and negligence. The former problem of payment without causation is
the more obviously serious: if people fear having to pay for conduct that
mistakenly may be believed to cause injuries, then they will be deterred from
engaging in that conduct and will tend to avoid it even if it is, on balance,
beneficial to society. The resulting overdeterrence is the strongest justification
for civil law reform. The latter problem, of procedural rules overriding a
substantive law negligence rule, is largely a matter of additional transaction costs
associated with litigating fault.
Ultimately, however, these transaction costs, and the costs of litigating even
meritorious cases, in both negligence and strict liability regimes, are quite
serious. Part I described how tort theory divides the costs of accidents into three
types, and attempts to minimize each: (1) the primary costs of accidents and
preventive measures; (2) the secondary costs of bearing the losses that do occur;
and (3) the tertiary costs of administering a system of tort law that tries to reduce
primary and secondary costs. As Parts II and III demonstrated, however, tertiary
costs cannot be separated from primary costs because tort law's level of
deterrence is achieved by the threat of paying both for the victim's injury and for
the costs of litigation. 69 Moreover, because a prevailing plaintiff will receive
only that portion of the recovery remaining after legal fees are deducted
(generally two-thirds), tort law compensation, and the loss spreading envisioned
by tort theory, will be incomplete. As a result, the secondary cost of leaving
accident costs upon the individual victim is only partially mitigated by our system
of tort law. 171
This close relationship between tertiary costs, on the one hand, and primary and
secondary accident costs, on the other, raises a conceptual problem that this
Article has not yet addressed: Are the costs of litigation properly included in the
social costs of an accident? On one hand, it would appear that the costs of
litigation should be internalized (i.e., borne by tortfeasors). Why should the costs
of a lawsuit be distinguished from other expenses (e.g., going to the hospital,
taking x-rays, missing work, or repairing a damaged automobile) that arise when
someone is injured? When someone is injured, legal expenses are likely to be a
part of the costs society bears. Accordingly, they should be included with the
primary costs of accidents and actors should take them into account when
deciding whether to risk causing the injury in the first place. According to this
rationale, tortfeasors should bear not only their own legal expenses, but also those

169. Indeed, although he does not focus upon it, Calabresi recognizes the connection: "The
differences between primary and secondary accident costs are not fixed nor are they always
clear.... The same is true with respect to tertiary accident costs." CALABRESI, supra note 6,
at 29.
170. Put another way, a portion of accident costs are never transferred to the entity best able
to spread those costs over the relevant activity's beneficiary (the defendant), but instead remain
with the plaintiff.
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of the plaintiff (and the costs of maintaining the judicial system).' Moreover, by
compensating tort victims as fully as possible, the tortfeasor's payment of a
victim's legal fees would serve to reduce secondary costs as well.
On the other hand, there are equally strong arguments against internalizing all
litigation expenses along with the costs of accidents. Although shifting a victim's
legal fees to liable tortfeasors may reduce secondary costs, it is far from clear that
making a tortfeasor pay litigation costs (either its own, the victim's, or society's)
will serve to minimize primary accident costs.
The principal rationale for internalizing accident costs (i.e., making tortfeasors
pay) is the minimization of primary accident costs.' 72 The law is intended to
discourage unreasonably risky behavior and to encourage actors to adopt efficient
safety precautions. The law should not, however, encourage excessively costly
precautions, nor should it inhibit activities whose benefits outweigh their burdens.
Yet, by including litigation costs among the expenses that we fear paying for any
injuries we inflict, our system of tort law alters the balance between costs and
benefits. Litigation costs may thus transform an efficient activity into an
inefficient one.
This effect of litigation costs is not inherently inefficient: if litigation expenses
are genuinely part of accident costs, and an activity's total accident costs,
including litigation expenses, are sufficiently large as to outweigh its benefits,
then that activity is, by definition, socially inefficient and, thus, should be
deterred.' However, unlike other primary accident costs, over which tortfeasors
may have control and as to which victims have no incentive to escalate, litigation
costs are an element of accident costs that tortfeasors may be unable to
minimize. 74
Ordinarily, a potential tortfeasor may have significant leeway in structuring his
activities so as to minimize the costs of both accidents and preventive measures.
For example, an electric tool manufacturer may design a fully functional electric
saw that guards against major injuries to a user's limbs, but may also find that
designing the saw to prevent injuries to fingers would unduly limit the saw's
usefulness. In choosing the optimal design for its product, the toolmaker can

171. The English requirement that the losing tortfeasor pay his victim's attorney's fees is
consistent with this sentiment. For a discussion of the various defenses of the English and
American rules, see, for example, Rowe, supra note 5.
172. See CALABRESI, supra note 6, at 26; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 14, at 1060.
General insurance, after all, can compensate individual tort victims and thereby spread accident
costs.
173. In fact, if the costs of litigation were factored into the Hand Formula for negligence,
some otherwise nonnegligent conduct would become actionable under a negligence standard.
See supra note 11 (explaining the Hand formula).
174. In contract law, by contrast, contracting parties can minimize the litigation costs of a
subsequent breach by including an arbitration clause in the contract. Cf Weston, supra note
31, at 930 (describing the effect of Coase's analysis on tort theory and noting that because in
the field of tort law "Coasian ex ante bargaining... is foreclosed in practice by transaction
costs, the role of the court is to approximate, through its liability rules, the bargain that those
parties would have reached").
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weigh the utility of the product against the risk of injuries. 75 Indeed, the
toolmaker is in a better position than anyone to judge the relative costs and
benefits of a product design. And, because that toolmaker is the "cheapest cost
avoider," society can most effectively reduce primary accident costs (i.e., the
costs of accidents and preventive efforts) by imposing liability upon that
toolmaker.
However, the toolmaker cannot control, ex ante (or even ex post), how much
a lawsuit will cost in the case of an injury; 76 it can only try to decrease the
likelihood of being sued by making the saw safer.' 77 Given that the toolmaker is
not in a position to reduce litigation costs, and is by no means the "cheapest cost
avoider" with respect to this element of accident costs, it is inefficient to impose
these costs upon the toolmaker. The toolmaker will simply respond to higher
litigation costs with increasingly safer products. The result will be unreasonably78
high litigation costs and overdeterrence of beneficial products and activities.
One might expect a similar analysis to apply to other accident costs as well, for
defendants likewise lack control over excessive health care costs that have
inflated the size of tort claims. But litigation costs are different. As described in
Part II, our system of litigation provides plaintiffs with incentives to increase
defendants' legal fees-in order to induce defendants to offer more in settlement.
A plaintiff's high medical bills, in contrast, will not increase the plaintiff's wealth
in a comparable way, for any additional amounts recovered from the defendant
to cover medical expenses will be passed on to doctors. Indeed, the plaintiff
would actually lose money by increasing his out-of-pocket medical expenses, for
he must pay his attorney one-third of any additional amounts recovered from the
defendant. Thus, although imposing high medical costs on tortfeasors will do
nothing to reduce inefficiencies in medical care, it also will not aggravate the
problems in health care. In contrast, inefficiencies in the litigation system are
actually perpetuated by rules that enable parties to inflict unreasonably high
litigation expenses on one another.

175. See generally KEETON ET'AL., supra note 7, § 99, at 699-700 (describing the risk-utility
test for products liability).
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. And, even if it opts for the greatest safety possible, it may still face a weak lawsuit from
someone who has misused the saw in such an unforeseeable way as to preclude a valid claim,
see KEETON Er AL., supranote 7, § 102, at 712, but who nevertheless hopes to obtain some

settlement from the toolmaker.
178. This is not to say that under our system of litigation a defendant's litigation expenses
necessarily will exceed what both parties' lawyers and the judiciary would cost in an efficient
system. If that were so, then even if defendants paid nothing for meritless cases, litigation costs
in meritorious cases (i.e., where causation is established) alone would produce overdeterrence.
Rather, the argument here is that some litigation expense might reasonably be treated not as
part of the costs of accidents, but rather as costs of rules that govern discovery, fee shifting, and
contingent fees. The costs of these rules should, together, be weighed against their collective
benefits (e.g., an injured person's access to justice). To the extent that some of these "external"
costs are, instead, simply imposed upon defendants, they lead to overdeterrence.
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Our tort system's current imposition of high litigation costs is not only
inefficient, but also unfair to defendants. 179 Recall that the ethical justification for
tort liability requires proof of causation, and that it is not only inefficient, but also
unfair, to require a defendant to devote resources to defending and settling
lawsuits for injuries that it did not cause.8 ° Even where a plaintiff has a
meritorious claim and can prove that the defendant caused his injury, however,
the defendant's lack of control over its own litigation expenses may be morally
troubling.
On one hand, as noted above, litigation costs are one of the social costs of an
accident, and the beneficiaries of the activity that caused the accident should
therefore bear those costs. On the other hand, it is not clear that unintentional
injurers should bear costs that they can neither control nor foresee. Intentional
tortfeasors must take their victims as they find them (e.g., if a battery victim dies
because of his weak heart, the batterer must accept the consequences).'
However, there is a long-standing debate over whether merely negligent actors,
let alone faultless actors, should bear such unforeseeable costs." 2 Moreover, it
seems unfair to burden a defendant with any injury cost for which the plaintiff
himself is responsible.' Only a flawed system would enable a tort victim to
increase his injurer's costs; yet, in our system of litigation, a tort victim can
actually improve his bargaining position, and thereby obtain a better settlement,
simply by inflicting litigation costs upon the defendant, (e.g., by requesting
extensive, unnecessary discovery).' 84
V. PROCEDURAL REFORM
America's combined approach to discovery, fee shifting, and contingent-fee
arrangements may help to explain why corporate America despairs at the
Repeat defendants, such as large
perceived litigiousness of our society.'
consumer product manufacturers, who face weak, or meritless, lawsuits are
disadvantaged by America's combined approach to the above three issues. It is
no wonder then that corporations have supported politicians who advocate tort
reform, and that anecdotes about the costs of frivolous lawsuits abound. 6 The
current hysteria over litigation's ills is justified insofar as the rules discussed

179. It is also unfair to plaintiffs. To the extent that our litigation rules preclude plaintiffs
from paying reasonable attorneys' fees on an hourly basis, and lead them instead to hire
contingency attorneys, these rules unfairly deprive plaintiffs of much of the compensation to
which they are entitled.
180. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
181. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 9, at 40 (stating that "it is better for unexpected
losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than upon the innocent victim").
182. See id. § 43, at 280 (describing "two basic, fundamental, opposing and irreconcilable
views").
183. Such a principle is embodied in the tort doctrines of contributory or comparative
negligence, as well as in the contract doctrine of the duty to mitigate one's damages.
184. See supra Part II.A-B. Of course, it is equally unfair for defendants to inflict such
unreasonably high litigation expenses on plaintiffs.
185. See sources cited supra note 1.
186. See generally sources cited supra note 1.
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above encourage meritless lawsuits and increase the amounts that repeat
defendants expect to pay in legal fees. In short, the procedural backdrop of
American litigation may accurately
be labeled "antidefendant" when compared
18 7
to other possible systems.
Yet, the fact that a particular provision may disfavor defendants does not
inherently determine whether it fosters an optimal level of deterrence. The
manner in which our procedural system disassociates the merits of a case from the
costs of litigating it, and lets those costs escalate, may properly be viewed as
harmful to efficient deterrence to the extent that it results in a divide between
what a defendant expects to pay for his conduct, and how substantive law rules
would judge that conduct. But the decision to allow contingent-fee arrangements,
which generally benefit plaintiffs, may actually enhance the accuracy of the
litigation system, so that settlements better reflect the true economic costs of
injuries. Recall that in the absence of contingent-fee arrangements, many of those
who are injured would have to forego meritorious claims or accept low
settlements.' 88 If accurate deterrence is the goal, defendants should not be able to
anticipate escaping liability for injuries they inflict simply because they know
their risk-averse victims will accept low settlements or will be unable to file suit
at all.
The goal of procedural reform, then, should be not simply to decrease the
amounts that defendants pay for lawsuits, but rather to enhance the accuracy of
settlements and eliminate undue legal expenses for both parties. Improved

187. To evaluate the procedural system's overall impact on defendants' pocketbooks, one
would have to examine also the procedural rules that affect settlement amounts by affecting the
likely verdict, such as rules governing selection of forum and fact finder-that is, jurisdiction
and venue, the right to ajury trial, and jury selection. Although these rules influence settlement
amounts as much as the rules addressed by this Article, their effect on settlement often depends
upon the facts of particular cases. For example, estimating the effect of ajury versus a bench
trial, or ajury pooled from one locality versus another, may often be a matter of speculation
about the likely attitude of a particular fact finder toward particular parties and facts.
Nonetheless, if a securities dealer or drug company does business throughout the country and
anticipates complicated financial or science-based causes of action, then it will expect long-arm
statutes and jury trials to increase its liability. Lawyers generally predict that jurors are more
sympathetic to individuals than to large institutions, more sympathetic to locals with similar
racial or ethnic backgrounds or with whom they can otherwise identify, and have greater
difficulty than judges in evaluating complex commercial or scientific evidence. See, e.g.,
WALTERF. ABBOTrETAL., JuRYREsEARCH § 4.08, at 22 (1993) ("It is conventional wisdom
among attorneys that similarity between client and juror is desirable on the grounds that this
similarity encourages identification of the juror with the client."); id. § 7.03(d), at 65-66
(summarizing sources on jurors' ability to evaluate complex evidence); Neil Vidmar, Empirical
Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain andSuffering in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 218 (1993) ("Physicians, liability insurers, and
commentators critical of the American tort system frequently raise the argument that juries are
biased against doctors and hospitals."). Although there is debate over the accuracy of many
lawyers' assumptions about juries, such as the ones noted above, see, e.g.,\ Kenneth J.
Chesebro, Galileo'sRetort: Peter Huber'sJunk Scholarship,42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637, 1700
& n.293 (1993) (citing sources), the prevalence of these attitudes can affect settlement amounts
regardless of whether they are accurate.
188. See supraPart III.A-B.
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procedural rules would continue to enable plaintiffs to file meritorious cases, but
would decrease
defendants' exposure to escalated legal fees and meritless
89
cases.1
The goals of accurate settlements and reasonable litigation costs do not require
the repeal of an entire set of procedural rules. Indeed, if we were simply to
reverse our approach in any of the three areas discussed by this Article-that is,
to eliminate liberal discovery, to shift fees, or to outlaw contingent-fee
arrangements-the cure might be worse than the disease. Absent liberal
discovery, outcomes might depart even further from the merits;' 90 fee shifting
would increase the stakes of litigation and inhibit risk-averse plaintiffs and even
their attorneys from filing meritorious claims where there is a risk of losing;
and, a ban on contingent-fee arrangements would reduce meritorious filings
significantly. 92
However, because variations in one rule may either counterbalance or reinforce
the effects of another, reform may be achieved through adjustment at the margins.
For example, the English system has alleviated the hardships of a pure loser-pays
fee-shifting regime by implementing programs such as legal aid. Indeed,
England's system is not really a pure two-way fee-shifting regime, as a sizeable
minority of personal injury plaintiffs qualify for legal aid. 93 Legal aid pays the
plaintiffs solicitor and barrister fees, as well as other expenses, and if the
plaintiff wins, legal aid is reimbursed by the defendant. If the plaintiff loses,
however, neither the plaintiff nor legal aid must pay the defendant's legal fees.
Thus, for English plaintiffs who qualify for legal aid (which is much more
common in England than in America)9 the basic two-way fee-shifting regime is
converted to a one-way shift.' 95

189. More efficient litigation rules also might help to ensure that plaintiffs' recoveries are
more complete: if litigation were less expensive, some plaintiffs' attorneys might be willing to
lower their contingent fees. Moreover, even if attorneys did not lower their fees, they would
be willing to accept smaller cases for the same percentage fee. As a result, plaintiffs would be
able to buy more effective representation for their money (and plaintiffs with the smallest of
cases would have an easier time finding counsel who are willing to represent them).
190. See supra Part II.B (noting that if it were not misused, discovery would promote
accurate settlement).
191. See supra Part III.A (noting the effect of fee shifting on risk-averse plaintiffs). If a feeshifting regime were structured so that a losing contingent-fee plaintiff's attorney, rather than
the plaintiff himself, were forced to bear the prevailing defendant's legal fees, this would
alleviate, but not eliminate, the problem. See Smith, supra note 76, at 2167 ("The risk of
indemnification will undoubtedly deter some plaintiffs from pursuing borderline claims, but
attorneys burdened with indemnification would reject many such claims anyway.").
192. See supraPart III.A.
193. In England, a member of a family earning as much as $45,000 can qualify for legal aid,
while in America, a member of a family of four must earn less than $14,562 (or less than $7212
if living alone) in order to qualify. See Vargo, supra note 76, at 1607 (citing Marianne W.
Young, Note, The Needfor Legal Aid Reform: A Comparison ofEnglish andAmerican Legal
Aid, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 379, 396 (1991)).
194. See id.
195. See id. Even if he does not qualify for legal aid, a plaintiff may qualify for trade-union
funding, in which case the plaintiff is insulated from all legal fees whether he wins or loses, but
the trade union must pay the defendant's legal fees if the plaintiff loses. See id. at 1608.

1997]

TORT LAW INCENTIVES

Even where a plaintiff must fund the lawsuit himself, some solicitors in England
will take a very promising case on a "spec" basis, under which the solicitor will
agree orally not to collect his fees until the conclusion of the case. 96 Such
agreements are not officially sanctioned, however, and there is a debate raging
over whether to allow "conditional" fees, which would leave the lawyer with
nothing if the plaintiff loses, or some multiple of the lawyer's hourly rate if the
plaintiff wins.' 97
The United States likewise could retain the core features of its
system-contingent fees, liberal discovery, and non-fee-shifting, which ensure
"access to justice"-and yet tone down the excesses that unduly prejudice
defendants. Reforms should be tailored to address the two problems outlined thus
far: (1) the inordinate expenses incurred for meritorious cases, and (2) the
problem of expenses for meritless cases. The suggestions that follow do not
attempt to exhaust the ways in which we could restructure our system of litigation
so as to alter the amounts that defendants pay, and expect to pay, for their
conduct. They serve merely as examples of possible procedural changes that
might alleviate the problem of overdeterrence caused by America's combined
approach to discovery, fee shifting, and contingent-fee arrangements.
First, amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (and comparable state
rules) could reduce unreasonably high litigation expenses in meritorious cases by
instituting a partial fee shift after some discovery has been taken and a settlement
offer is on the table. Today, Rule 68 modifies the customary practice that losing
parties bear court costs (a relatively minor expense). Rule 68 forces a prevailing
plaintiff to bear court costs if the plaintiff's verdict is less than the defendant had
offered in settlement.'98 Some have advocated extending Rule 68 to include
postoffer attorneys' fees, and to cover settlement offers by plaintiffs, so that our
general regime of non-fee-shifting would be transformed into a modified fee-

196. See id. at 1607.
197. Compare Conditions and Fees, 143 NEW L.J. 1665 (1993) (noting the potential
problems of conditional-fee arrangements, including, inter alia, denigration of the legal
profession's image, and litigants' loss of significant amounts of money), with David
Bedingfield, The ContingencyFee System in America, 143 NEW L.J. 1670 (1993) (stating that
contingency and conditional-fee arrangements open the courthouse door and give injured
parties their day in court in as cheap a manner as possible). It is also worth noting that the
English fee shift is not a complete fee shift. The courts distinguish between "solicitor-client"
costs--the amount the client agrees to pay his attorney-and "party-party" costs-the amount
that the court deems necessary to litigate the case. Party-party costs average about two-thirds
of solicitor-client costs. See Vargo, supra note 76, at 1606 (citing GENN, supranote 83, at 34).
The fact that only party-party costs are shifted decreases somewhat the hardship of losing at
trial because the loser need not pay unnecessary fees.
Australia's system represents another hybrid. While Australia has adopted the English feeshifting rule, Australia moderates this rule by allowing solicitors to accept cases on a "spec"
basis, under which they will receive an amount higher than their usual rate if they win (though
not a percentage of the amount of the judgment). Moreover, although clients must remain
responsible for out-of-pocket legal expenses, solicitors may loan plaintiffs the expenses
necessary to pursue their claims. Legal aid, however, is largely unavailable. See id. at 1613-17.
198. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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shifting regime once a settlement offer was on the table. 99 If Rule 68 were
amended in this manner, potential defendants would be guaranteed to pay no
more than the fair value of a potential lawsuit, because any defendant willing to
offer an amount exceeding the ultimate verdict would shift the costs of continued
litigation to the plaintiff. 00 Yet, plaintiffs could avoid being coerced into
unreasonably low settlements simply by making suitable counteroffers, which
defendants would then be inclined to accept for fear of bearing all
postcounteroffer legal fees."' The Rule might further protect against coercive
offers (designed to play upon risk aversion, rather than the merits of a case) by
covering only the lesser of the two parties' postoffer legal fees, applying only to
settlement offers made after reasonable discovery has been conducted, 0 2 and then
only to offers deemed reasonable by a judge.
Indeed, in order to tie litigation and settlement dynamics more closely to the
merits, an amended Rule 68 could extend the formal pretrial role of judges
beyond simply deciding whether material issues of fact exist. Instead, the judge
would actually weigh the facts to determine whether the parties' offers of
settlement were reasonable, who should bear the costs of continuing litigation,

199. See COMMIrrEEON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1983), reprintedin 98 F.R.D. 337, 361-63 (1983) (proposing amendments to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68); Rowe, supra note 5, at 895-96; Mary A. Hackett et al.,
Note, Rule 68: An Offer You Can't Afford to Refuse, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 373, 379-82 (1985)

(comparing the federal rule with N.J. CT. R. 4:58).
Geoffrey Miller and David Anderson have provided an economic analysis of such a modified
Rule 68. See Anderson, supra note 83, at 236-40; Miller, supra note 83, at 117-25. Although
economic modeling casts doubt upon the ability of Rule 68, and its various permutations, to
encourage settlement where parties otherwise would not settle, see Anderson, supra note 83,
at 240, this Article endorses amendments to Rule 68, not in order to encourage additional
settlements (which are sufficiently prevalent), but rather to promote more accurate deterrence.
A modified Rule 68 could contribute to this goal by assuring defendants ex ante that their tortrelated payments ex post will depend upon the merits of cases, rather than upon the expense
of litigation.
200. It is true that under a modified Rule 68, defendants would structure their behavior ex
ante based not only on the likelihood of winning lawsuits (which would be a positive
development) but also on the likelihood that they will be able to make accurate settlement
offers in meritorious cases and thereby evade much of litigations's expense. See generally
Calfee & Craswell, supra note 4 (describing effects of uncertainty on compliance levels of
potential defendants). But if defendants are at all able to predict the likely costs and benefits
of their actions ex ante (as our tort system assumes they can) then defendants should have some
confidence in their ability to estimate a victim's injuries (and the jury's likely verdict) once
those injuries have occurred. But cf Gross & Syverud, supra note 100, at 46-50 (seeking to
explain why trial outcomes generally do not strike a compromise between parties' settlement
positions).
201. Cf Miller, supranote 83, at 123-25. Plaintiffs and their attorneys would be free to work
out for themselves who would bear defendants' postoffer fees in case of a loss, and to adjust
their fee arrangement accordingly.
202. See Hackett et al., supra note 199, at 399.
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and on what terms. 2°3 As a result, parties would have incentives to conduct
discovery quickly and efficiently so that they could evaluate the merits before
settlement offers were exchanged under judicial supervision.
If a judge were to decide that a settlement offer was inconsistent with the
merits, or that additional discovery was needed before its suitability could be
determined, then each party would continue to bear its own legal fees.20 4
However, an additional reform might empower the judge to decide that if one
party or the other still had not uncovered the evidence it required after a certain
level of discovery expense was reached, then that requesting party would have to
reimburse its opponent for any future requests.2 5
Such reforms would decrease litigation expenses associated with meritorious
cases, but would not necessarily protect defendants from meritless claims.
Knowing that fee shifting would not kick in until after defendants already had
devoted some resources, plaintiffs' attorneys might continue to file weak or
meritless cases with little investigation in the hope that defendants will settle
before a reasonable level of discovery is reached and a judge has approved the
onset of fee shifting.
In order to reduce defendants' expenses for meritless cases, the system would
have to shift fees incurred from the outset-as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 enables a judge to do.2" 6 The problem is that judges are reluctant to award

203. Although parties would retain the right to proceed to trial, the judge would essentially
decide that if they do so and do not improve their position, they should bear the full costs of
their decision to proceed. Cf.Alschuler, supra note 107 (proposing a two-tier trial system in
which a magistrate or master would conduct an abbreviated trial and parties would have the
right to pursue fuller discovery and a jury trial, but the parties would also be required to bear
the government's costs of trial if they did not improve their position). Permitting judges to
weigh evidence would not be unprecedented, as judges have long been empowered to weigh
evidence when setting aside verdicts and granting new trials. See Young B. Smith, The Power
ofthe Judge to Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of the New York CivilPracticeAct, 24 COLUM.
L. REV. 111, 116-17 (1924) (chronicling the history of new trials and directed verdicts and
discussing aNew York rule that would allow judges to weigh evidence even when directing
a verdict).
204. If, for example, a defendant were to offer one dollar to settle a meritorious, but close,
case, this would not entitle him to all postoffer legal fees if he wins.
205. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supranote 60, at 455-57.
206. In the law and economics literature Bebchuk and Chang, and Polinsky and Rubenfeld
have modeled various forms of sanctions for frivolous litigation and Marshall, Kritzer, and
Zemans provide empirical background confirming the effectiveness of Rule 11. See Bebchuk
& Chang, supra note 76; Marshall et al., supra note 105; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubenfeld, SanctioningFrivolousSuits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397 (1993). In
order to provide plaintiffs with appropriate incentives to bring meritorious but not meritless
suits, Bebchuk and Chang advocate a Rule II regime that takes into account not only the
strength or weakness of a claim, but a plaintiff's incentive to bring the claim in the first place;
sanctions thus would be imposed less frequently for categories of lawsuits that are socially
useful but expensive for plaintiffs to pursue. See Bebchuk & Chang, supranote 76, at 394-402.
Polinsky and Rubenfeld propose a regime of "decoupled" sanctions in which the moving party
receives a portion of any sanction imposed upon his opponent, and the judicial system receives
the remainder; this would provide parties with incentives to bring bad acts to the court's
attention and thus achieve efficient deterrence of frivolous suits, but would avoid inducing
parties to devote too much effort to satellite Rule 11 litigation. See Polinsky & Rubenfeld,
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legal fees as a sanction for meritless cases. °7 When a judge examines the
evidence produced by discovery and concludes that there is no outstanding issue
of material fact and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this
does not mean that the complaint was filed in bad faith or "for any improper
purpose.""0 8 Indeed, Part III.D demonstrated that while some meritless suits may
be filed by plaintiffs' attorneys who know they are meritless, many more are filed
because plaintiffs' attorneys take on more cases than they have time to
investigate.
The 1983 amendments improved Rule 11 by instructing a judge to impose
sanctions if the plaintiffs' attorney did not engage in "reasonable inquiry" before
filing the complaint.0 9 Under the revised rule, the plaintiffs' attorney was
required to conduct his own inquiry before imposing any investigation costs upon
the defendant; if "reasonable inquiry" could have uncovered evidence
establishing the meritlessness of a claim before filing, then there was no need for
discovery and the plaintiffs' attorney should reimburse the defendant for his
expenses. The 1993 amendments, however, expressly protected a plaintiff's
ability to base a claim on "information and belief' rather than evidentiary
support, and created a "safe harbor" in which plaintiffs may withdraw allegations
without being subject to Rule 11 sanctions.1 0 This created a concern that "some
litigants may be tempted to conduct less of a pre-filing investigation."2 1 '
There is nothing objectionable in making express a plaintiff's long-standing
right to plead on "information and belief--any other rule would eliminate the

supra, at 417-19. Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans conducted lawyer surveys revealing that in
practice Rule 11 does not give rise to inordinately expensive satellite litigation and thus is an
efficient way to deter frivolous claims and defenses. See Marshall et al., supranote 105, at 95860, 985. Indeed 60% of attorneys reported that in the preceding year thay had altered their
behavior (e.g., by foregoing a claim or defense or conducting additional review) because of the
threat of sanctions posed by Rule 11. See id. at 960-61.
207. The willingness ofjudges to impose Rule 11 sanctions (and parties to move for them)
varies from district to district. See Marshall et al., supra note 105, at 976-79. Rule 11 sanctions
are imposed more frequently in metropolitan areas than in nonurban or mid-sized urban
districts. See id.
This may be due to the differences in attorney conduct and corresponding
differences in the need for Rule II sanctions, or else to different thresholds before Rule 11
sanctions will be imposed. Although the survey suggests that "a good degree of lawyerly
reaction to Rule 11 is not tailored to the actual risk that lawyers face but is based more on
general reaction to the rhetoric about the threats that the Rule creates," id at 978-79, this
Article proposes a Rule 11 standard that may contribute to a more uniform application of the
Rule throughout the nation.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
209. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § I lApp.101 [2] (3d ed.
1997) (explaining how the 1983 amendment changed the standard of conduct an attorney must
follow from subjective good faith to an objective standard of conduct).
210. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Attachment B to Letter from Sam C.
Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee of Civil Rules, to Hon. Robert E. Keeton,
Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted
in SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
FoRMs, H.R. Doc. No. 103-74 (1993), reprintedin 146 F.R.D. 401, 522-25 (1993).

211. Id.at 524 (offering notes regarding proposed amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11).
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utility of discovery by requiring plaintiffs to have all relevant facts in hand upon
filing a complaint. (Nor is there anything inherently wrong with encouraging
plaintiffs to withdraw meritless claims upon learning of their defects."') The
appropriate question, however, is when and to what extent defendants should have
to pay for plaintiffs to investigate allegations that ultimately never find
evidentiary support. Although the system should encourage plaintiffs to file suits
where they reasonably expect discovery to uncover supporting evidence, a rule
that requires defendants to pay for discovery in every case also encourages
plaintiffs to file suits (and receive settlements) where discovery is unlikely to
reveal supporting evidence. 3
To encourage meritorious suits but discourage meritless ones, Rule 11
jurisprudence might borrow principles from substantive negligence law. By filing
a losing lawsuit, after all, plaintiffs and their attorneys themselves become the
tortfeasors in a sense, causing unlawful injury to defendants. 24 The English feeshifting model imposes strict liability for losing lawsuits by requiring the plaintiff
to compensate the defendant regardless of whether the plaintiff could have known
at the outset that his suit was meritless. Rule 11, in contrast, imposes only
negligence liability, requiring plaintiffs to engage in reasonable investigation of
the facts before filing, but refusing to shift the expense of a losing lawsuit if the
plaintiff reasonably believed it to have merit. The United States' decision to
impose negligence, rather than strict liability, for losing lawsuits reflects the
United States' commitment to preserving access to justice and fear of inhibiting
meritorious claims. However, if Rule 11 is really to impose negligence liability
(as opposed to punishing only intentional wrongdoing) plaintiffs' attorneys
should be required not only to investigate their clients' allegations before filing,
but also at least to consider the costs of discovery for any unsupported allegations
that remain." 5 This is not to say that the reasonableness inquiry necessarily
requires a strict weighing of likely discovery costs against the likely recovery (in
the case of a victory for the plaintiff). Because society benefits from the filing of
small, meritorious claims-even if the costs outweigh the benefits for the
particular parties involved-plaintiffs should be permitted to pursue claims with

212. But see AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing safe harbor), in SUPREME COURTOFTHE U.S., supranote 211, reprinted
in 146 F.R.D. at 507-08.
213. Survey evidence reveals that the threat of Rule 11 sanctions led 32.3% of plaintiffs'
attorneys to conduct "extra prefiling review of pleadings, motions or other documents subject
to Rule I1," as compared to 39.6% of defendants' attorneys (who have incentives in any event
to work additional hours where they are paid by the hour). Marshall et al., supranote 105, at
962-64 (emphasis in original). Although Rule II as currently applied thus has a significant
effect on attorney behavior, this Article's proposed increase in emphasis on prefiling
investigation might lead plaintiffs' attorneys even more often to avoid filing potentially
meritless lawsuits without learning enough first to know whether discovery is reasonably likely
to reveal supporting evidence.
214. In contrast, defendants themselves bear responsibility for meritorious suits.
215. See supra note 137 (describing uninformed plaintiffs' incentives to shift investigation
costs to defendants by filing lawsuits and thereby becoming entitled to discovery).
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substantial social benefits." However, if discovery is unlikely to reveal
supporting evidence for an allegation, then the attorney's decision to include that
allegation in his initial complaint-and thereby to inflict costs upon the
defendant-should not be deemed reasonable. Plaintiffs and attorneys should pay
compensation if their hope of uncovering supporting evidence was unreasonable
from the outset and is proven to be unreasonable by subsequent discovery.
Finally, Rules 11 and 26 could work together to ensure not only that complaints
contain only the allegations for which discovery might reasonably find support,
but also that the discovery subsequently requested is reasonably tailored to find
support for these allegations." 7 Indeed, a plaintiff could be forbidden from asking
for-broad discovery of evidence potentially relevant to various aspects of a
lawsuit until he has first conducted narrow discovery tailored to uncover the
evidence he will need to withstand summary judgment on unsupported allegations
in his complaint."' By limiting the expense defendants must bear in the early
stages of litigation, such reforms would reduce defendants' incentives to settle
meritless lawsuits, and thus plaintiffs' incentives to file them.
CONCLUSION

Part I of this Article explored how tort law could achieve its goals-efficient
and fair deterrence and compensation-in a hypothetical world in which
defendants' conduct is judged solely according to substantive law. Parts II and
III demonstrated that real world litigation skews the incentives posited by the
theoretical model. In fact, litigation costs play such a significant role that they
may well overshadow the merits when plaintiffs decide to file, and parties decide
to settle, lawsuits. Part II focused on two features of American litigation-the
rules governing discovery and fee shifting-that together lead parties to bear
unreasonably large litigation costs, beyond their control, regardless of the merits.
Part III then demonstrated that the availability of contingent-fee arrangements
ensures that these high legal fees do not induce plaintiffs to forego meritorious

216. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 76, at 394-402 (suggesting that Rule II analysis
consider a plaintiff's initial incentives to file or forego different types of legal claims, so that
sanctions discourage abusive suits without inhibiting desirable, though perhaps novel or
expensive, claims); see also Hay, supra note 60, at 483 (noting that private incentives and
social incentives may differ, and that even if a discovery request does not increase the value
of the requesting party's claim sufficiently to justify its cost, the request may nevertheless be
socially efficient if it induces defendants to take precautions against inflicting harm); cf Bone,
supra note 129, at 591-92 (noting that in the informed-defendant model, only a modest penalty
is needed to deter frivolous suits, and that excessive penalties might inhibit weak but
meritorious claims).
217. See Sofaer, supra note 67, at 723 (noting that "[d]iscovery is... made costly because
of the legal theories on which courts have permitted suits to proceed" and because "plaintiffs
[may] file complaints in which they need do little more than allege an injury that is believed
to have resulted from some dangerous instrumentality or activity.... [a practice which] will
generally entitle them to search for an explanation through discovery").
218. But cf Sugarman & Perlin, supra note 66, at 1482 (criticizing the Council on
Competitiveness's recommendation tying discovery requests to pleadings, and calling it "a rule
departing from notice pleading and renewing reliance on factual allegations").
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claims or settle them routinely for less than the merits warrant. Rather, the
combined effect of the three sets of rules is to lead defendants to pay not only fair
settlements for the injuries they inflict, but also significant litigation expenses in
meritorious cases and significant amounts to dispose of meritless cases. In short,
defendants must pay more for their conduct than they would if they looked to
substantive law alone.
Part IV then showed how these practicalities of litigation and settlement alter
the tort law deterrence envisioned by theorists in two important ways. First, by
allowing the filing and settlement of meritless lawsuits, our system of litigation
deters productive conduct that does not even cause injury. Second, when
unreasonably high litigation costs are inappropriately factored into the costs of
accidents, the tort system fails to minimize total accident costs and instead deters
efficient conduct.
Finally, Part V suggested that Rule 68 might be amended so as to tie litigation
and settlement dynamics more closely to the merits, and that Rules 11 and 26
might be applied in such a way as to protect defendants from meritless filings.

